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New Puzzles in International Tax Agreements 
 






The G7’s “global minimum tax” accord—followed by a new version of the OECD’s “Two Pillar 
Solution” and its endorsement by the G20—is accepted by many as evidence for international tax 
cooperation. But recent policy discussions offer no answer to a basic question: What can countries 
cooperate to achieve? This Article shows that the answers provided by proponents of the new 
international tax agreement are alarmingly ad hoc, misleading, and incoherent. Scholarship on corporate 
taxation has also long failed to identify potentials for international cooperation. The more successful 
international agreements purport to be, therefore, the more puzzling they become. 
 I first examine three rationales recently identified for collective action. The first alleges a 
transformation in the services trade that supposedly undermines premises of traditional international 
tax design. The second emphasizes the international community’s need to appease the United States 
and prevent the latter from starting trade wars. Both make unusual and untenable factual and 
normative assumptions. A third rationale seems more familiar—countries should cooperate to end tax 
competition and multinational companies’ tax avoidance—but is at odds with both economic theory and 
the actual content of the OECD’s proposal. Theoretically, ending tax competitions—whether for 
productive capital or for corporate headquarters—cannot create gains for all countries. And in terms of 
policy content, the OECD proposal can more plausibly be read as limiting, rather than enhancing, 
governments’ capacities to tax MNCs.  
 Older and more basic puzzles in theories of international taxation—concerning source-country 
taxation, residence countries’ unilateral relief from double taxation, and bilateral tax treaties—
compound these new puzzles. Arguably, these puzzles have led tax scholars to abandon a basic social 
scientific template for explaining cooperation. Indeed, much of economic scholarship takes international 
tax institutions as exogenously given.  I contrast this state of affairs with economic theories of trade 
agreements—in particular, with the way the “terms-of-trade” theory rationalizes the GATT/WTO 
regime. To emulate the success of the “terms-of-trade” theory, I argue, certain assumptions that have 
long prevailed in discourses about international taxation may need to be jettisoned. Only a more 
fundamental reconceptualization of the subject matter of international taxation can shed light on the 
true past and future grounds for international tax cooperation. 
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On June 5, 2021, finance ministers of the G7 group of advanced economies emerged from a 
meeting in London to announce their agreement, in principle, to implement a “global minimum tax.”1 
The governments involved instantly proclaimed the agreement to be “seismic,” “landmark,” and 
“historic.”2 U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen declared that it “would end the race-to-the-bottom in 
corporate taxation, and ensure fairness for the middle class and working people in the U.S. and around 
the world.”3 Although the agreement was vaguely-worded, the participating governments and the news 
media rushed to emphasize its significance in opening a new frontier of international cooperation. A 
narrative is emerging that global cooperation on tax matters is at once difficult to achieve and critical for 
global welfare—much like global efforts to combat climate change—and the new international tax 
                                                          
1 G7 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors Communiqué, US DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jun. 5, 2021), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0215.  
2 HM Treasury, G7 Finance Ministers Agree Historic Global Tax Agreement, G7UK2021 (Jun. 5, 2021), 
https://www.g7uk.org/g7-finance-ministers-agree-historic-global-tax-agreement/ [hereinafter UK G7 Press 
Release]; Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen Following the Close of the G7 
Finance Ministers Meetings, US DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jun. 5, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/jy0216.  
3 UK G7 Press Release, supra. 
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agreement represents a breakthrough, not just in policymaking, but also in successful statesmanship 
against all odds.4 
 
This narrative has not only captivated the global public imagination, but has also come to appear 
overwhelmingly plausible, for two distinct reasons. The first is the very public way in which many 
countries seem to have indicated their support for a new global tax agreement. The G7 countries clearly 
positioned themselves as sponsors of such an agreement in June 2021. Then on July 10, finance 
ministers of the G20 countries met in Venice and backed the G7’s proposal,5 adding the weight of China, 
Russia, India and other countries to the proposed agreement. The G20’s endorsement was in fact a 
foregone conclusion: in late June of 2021, a forum called the “Inclusive Framework” (IF)—a group of 139 
countries that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has convened since 
2016 to discuss international taxation—met to deliberate about the basic components of a global tax 
reform plan, which would flesh out the G7’s proposal and serve as the basis of the G20’s agreement. On 
July 1, 2021, 130 of these countries endorsed an OECD outline of the plan.6 Three other countries have 
added their endorsement since then, leaving only 6 countries to withhold their support as of August 
2021.7 With opponents overwhelmingly outnumbered by supporters, and with both groups in the public 
spotlight, the momentum for cooperation seems irreversible. The OECD contemplates that “a detailed 
implementation plan together with remaining issues will be finalized by October 2021.”8 Even if the 
negotiations become protracted, it seems difficult to imagine the process to entirely unravel.  
 
Second, there appears to be abundant consensus about the inadequacies of the current 
international tax system, leading to a cornucopia of stories about past stagnation and the accumulating 
burdens of the status quo. Many, for example, argue that as a result of tax competition—the opposite of 
cooperation—countries have been forced to lower their corporate income tax (CIT) rates for decades.9 If 
this story is accepted, it seems very compelling to view the G7 minimum tax agreement as presenting “a 
first step to reverse a four-decade decline in the taxes paid by multinational corporations.”10 Others 
have claimed that the lack of coordination among nations has led to rampant tax avoidance by 
multinational companies (MNCs).11 It has become quite popular to portray this as a longstanding global 
problem requiring concerted international response.12 Finally, many scholars have long argued that the 
                                                          
4 Arthur Cockfield, Globalization is alive and well and made healthier by the worldwide minimum tax agreement, 
TORONTO STAR (Aug. 03, 2021); Richard Partington, Global tax reform: 130 countries commit to minimum corporate 
rate, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 1, 2021, 19:47 BST).  
5 Christopher Condon, et al., G-20 Finance Chiefs Back Tax Deal and Vow to Clear Hurdles, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 10, 2021, 
8:08 AM PDT).  
6 OECD, STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE 
ECONOMY – 1 JULY 2021 (2021) hereinafter OECD July 2021 statement]. 
7 Kiarra M. Strocko, Barbados Joins OECD Corporate Tax Reform Plan, 103 TAX NOTES INT’L 905 (Aug. 16, 2021). The 6 
countries are Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. 
8 OECD July 2021 statement, supra note 6, at 4. 
9 CORPORATE INCOME TAXES UNDER PRESSURE: WHY REFORM IS NEEDED AND HOW IT COULD BE DESIGNED (Ruud A. De Mooij, 
Alexander D. Klemm & Victoria J. Perry, eds., 2021). 
10 Jeff Stein & Antonia Noori Farzan, G-7 countries reach agreement on 15 percent minimum global tax rate, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 5, 2021, 4:36 PM EDT).  Part I.B.2 and Part II.A infra discuss scholarly disputes about the 
existence and mechanisms of corporate tax competition. 
11 Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114:3 AM. J. INT’L L. 353 (2020); Gabriel Zucman and Gus 
Wezerek, This is Tax Evasion, Plain and Simple, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2021). 
12 There are, however, strong disagreements about evidence for these claims among international tax specialists. 
See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai, Richard Musgrave Lecture: Myths and Mysteries of the Corporate Income Tax (Mar. 24, 
2021) (lecture slides available at https://www.cesifo.org/en/node/62081); Dhammika Dharmapala, Do 
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de facto allocation of taxing rights among nations is unfair—a problem that countries clearly are capable 
of addressing only by cooperating with one another.13 In light of all these problems, the need for global 
tax cooperation may seem all too obvious. Consequently, when the UK government claimed that 
“discussions on the two Pillars”—referring to proposals for reforming international taxation that the 
OECD advanced as recently as in 2019—have “been ongoing for many years,”14 few noticed the 
incongruous chronology.15  
 
Contrary to all such appearances, this article sets out a skeptical perspective on the international 
tax agreement currently under discussion. Specifically, I highlight a fundamental intellectual challenge 
that both recent policy discussions and a large body of legal and economic scholarship on international 
taxation have not come even close to meeting—the challenge of answering the simple, but 
indispensable, question: What are countries cooperating in the international tax sphere to achieve? I 
will show that the answers offered by the current proponents of the new international tax agreement 
are alarmingly ad hoc, misleading, and incoherent. Moreover, I will highlight how a large body of 
scholarship on the corporate income tax has failed to yield any coherent story about how countries can 
meaningfully cooperate. In the end, the Article will argue, a careful observer would not be able to tell 
whether countries are cooperating in international taxation or instead engaging in a zero-sum game—is 
global welfare being enhanced by global agreements, or are some countries simply gaining at the 
expense of others?  
 
 To develop this perspective, I first identify three puzzles in recent narratives about why 
countries should cooperate in corporate taxation, corresponding to three very different rationales that 
the OECD has identified over time for collective action.16 A first rationale asserts that global business 
transactions have become so predominantly remote-based that basic assumptions of the traditional 
international tax regime, adopted in an era where “brick and mortar” businesses dominated, no longer 
hold.17 However, there is little evidence that, globally, the remote provision of services is increasing at 
the expense of trade through branches and foreign affiliates. Any change of this kind appears to be 
highly sector- and country-specific. This renders the OECD’s claim that any international reform must be 
based on global agreement—and cannot be limited to specific industries—puzzling.18   
 
                                                          
Multinational Firms Use Tax Havens to the Detriment of Other Countries?, in GLOBAL GOLIATHS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY 437 (C. F. Foley, J. R. Hines, & D. Wessel, eds., 2021); James R. Hines Jr., 
How Serious Is the Problem of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting?, 62:2 CAN. TAX J. 443 (2014). Whether international 
cooperation is needed to end tax avoidance is discussed in Part I.C.1 infra.  
13 LAURENS VAN APELDOORN & ALLISON CHRISTIANS, TAX COOPERATION IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2021); TSILLY DAGAN, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (2018).  
14 UK G7 Press release, supra note 2.  
15 Likewise, the New York Times claimed that Secretary Yellen “secured a landmark international tax 
agreement…that has eluded the United States for nearly a decade.” Alan Rappeport, Yellen Won a Global Tax Deal. 
Now Comes the Hard Part., N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2021, 9:47 AM ET). It is unclear what this near-decade-long effort on 
the part of the U.S. refers to. Whether or not history is being written, it is certainly being re-written.  
16 See Part I infra.  
17 This rationale, advanced by various governments and commentators, was officialized in OECD, TAX CHALLENGES 
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION–INTERIM REPORT 2018: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 23-59 (2018) [hereinafter OECD 2018 
Report].  
18 See Part I.A infra for detailed discussion. 
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A second rationale, propounded by the OECD since November 2020,19 is that an international 
agreement is needed to appease the United States and prevent it from starting trade wars. Even on its 
face, this is a highly unusual justification for global cooperation. Moreover, the actions that the U.S. 
threatens to take against other countries are already regulated by the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) extensive set of international trade rules. The OECD’s call for new global agreements thus seems 
premised on one country’s entitlement to violate existing global trade agreements, and the puzzling 
view that international cooperation can succeed simply by changing the forum in which it occurs.20       
 
 The third puzzle arises from a glaring gap between what the G7 claims as already agreed-upon 
policies (a “global minimum tax”) and the actual policies under discussion among the G20 and the IF 
countries:21  nowhere in the OECD’s “Two Pillar” solution do countries actually commit to adopting a 
minimum corporate tax rate. Moreover, what is in the OECD’s proposal can be more plausibly read as 
limiting, rather than enhancing, countries’ capacities to tax MNCs. This gap between labeling and 
substance underscores certain longstanding, unanswered questions: in particular, how cooperating to 
end tax competitions—whether it is competition for productive capital or for corporate headquarters—
creates gains for all countries. No new argument for the existence of such cooperative gain has been 
advanced in the latest discussions.22 In sum, all three major justifications recently advanced for a new 
global tax agreement are unusual on their face and unsatisfactory upon closer examination.  
 
 Next, I take a step back and consider whether past scholarship—especially economic research—
has identified general rationales for cooperation in international corporate income taxation.23 The 
answer, strikingly, is No. Economic theory has in fact long struggled to explain basic features of the 
international tax system: why source countries tax the inflow of foreign capital in the first place, why 
residence countries grant unilateral relief from double taxation through foreign tax credits or 
exemptions, and why countries negotiate bilateral tax treaties have all been longstanding puzzles for 
scholars.24 Even more importantly, because of these puzzles, tax scholars have foregone a basic and near 
universal template for explaining actual and proposed cooperation: identifying what countries do in the 
absence of cooperation, what they can all gain from cooperation, and what incentive mechanisms 
would secure mutually beneficial cooperation. In international tax, what countries do seemingly in the 
absence of cooperation cannot be easily explained. The objective of cooperation, and indeed even 
what’s best from the global perspective, consequently also become obscure.25 I will argue that these old 
puzzles explain why some of the purported objectives of the new international agreement—such as 
ending corporate tax competition and the use of tax havens—are far more problematic than they might 
first appear. Moreover, the depth of these puzzles also explains why they are not better known.  
 
 Tax specialists may be so accustomed to not having coherent accounts of international 
cooperation that they forget what it is like to have a coherent one. And those who do not specialize in 
international tax may find the language of the field too obscure to question its claims about 
cooperation. To resolve this predicament, I suggest, as a final argument, that tax scholars can benefit 
                                                          
19 OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT 11 (2020) (hereinafter OECD 2020 
Impact Assessment).  
20 See Part I.B infra for detailed discussion. 
21 See references in infra note 31 for the main documents in the OECD’s Two Pillar proposal.  
22 See Part I.C infra for detailed discussion. 
23 See Part II infra. 
24 See Part II.A, II.B, and II.C infra respectively. 
25 See Part II.D infra. 
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from a general model for explaining international cooperation that emerges from economic theories of 
trade agreements.26 In an influential body of scholarship often referred to as the “terms-of-trade” 
theory, economists focus on a particular type of harmful externality that emerges from unilateral trade 
policies to explain the benefits of trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). In the absence of cooperation, large countries exercise their monopsony power in global 
markets by raising tariffs on imports, which increase their national incomes at the expense of exporting 
nations. With cooperation through trade agreements, countries refrain from such beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies: this neutralizes terms-of-trade manipulations as a source of harmful externalities, while leaving 
countries free to pursue other domestic policy objectives.  
 
The terms-of-trade theory displays significant explanatory power: it has amassed impressive 
empirical evidence for how countries behave in the absence of cooperation and how benefits accrued to 
the parties to GATT; it also gives close attention to features of the GATT architecture that allow 
countries to negotiate mutually beneficial outcomes and enforce the outcomes of prior bargains.27 
Although it is not the only theory of existing trade agreements, it exemplifies a general social scientific 
approach to explaining cooperation, which competing theories will need to emulate.28 By comparison to 
this approach, in international taxation, the question of what global welfare gain can be achieved 
through international cooperation is basically unanswered: obviously unsatisfactory “folk theories” 
about double taxation and tax competition continue to occupy this void.29   
 
 It is important to clarify at the outset the basic thrust and intended contribution of the skeptical 
view developed in this Article. Just like domestic policies, all international agreements have their critics. 
However, critiquing the design of the new international tax agreement proposed by the G7, G20, and 
the OECD is not the main object of this article. Rather, the skeptical perspective developed here matters 
for three reasons distinct from any dissatisfaction with these proposals’ design. First, increasingly, 
participants in the international tax discourse engendered by these recent policy developments share 
neither common normative assumptions nor similar understandings of how international tax rules have 
worked. This article identifies some of the most substantial divergences in understanding, which 
proponents of global tax reform often neglect to acknowledge.  
 
Second, I give particular emphasis to how economic theory would rationalize existing 
international tax institutions and currently proposed reforms. By all accounts, these reforms would 
generate unprecedented international legal obligations to implement tax policy, with mechanisms of 
enforcement just beginning to be envisioned.30 Questions of what is in the unilateral interest of nations 
to do, and what each nation gains from cooperation, are critical for predicting the levels of enforcement: 
counting on nations to do things that are in neither their individual nor collective interests seems 
foolish, and the interpretation of rules is affected by the expectation of enforcement. In that sense, 
examining international cooperation with the lens of economic theory is a matter of practical necessity, 
not just of intellectual curiosity. 
                                                          
26 See Part III infra.  
27 See Part III.B infra.   
28 See Part III.B infra, in particular, about a new theory of offshoring identifying new problems in trade requiring 
different forms of cooperation.   
29 See Part III.C infra. 
30 Mary C. Bennett, Contemplating a Multilateral Convention to Implement OECD Pillars 1 and 2, TAX NOTES (Jun. 11, 
2021), 1729-1744; Jinyan Li, The Legal Challenges of Creating a Global Tax Regime with the OECD Pillar One 




 Third and most importantly, there may be better ways of envisioning international tax 
cooperation. In fact, theories of trade agreements help identify and even provide a model for the 
possible components of such a vision. I briefly comment on these components in Part IV, but I will argue 
that the path towards this new vision is blocked by certain problematic assumptions that have long 
prevailed in both policy and scholarly discourses on international taxation. These assumptions have 
been relied on in ever more questionable ways in recent claims about the promises of new international 
tax cooperation. The price of continuing to accept such assumptions is not just missed political 
opportunities and squandered global goodwill. By entrenching these assumptions, scholars in the future 
will need to accept international tax institutions as simply given—even more than they already have in 
the past—and hence struggle even more to guide their practical design. All these are reasons we should 
be sharply skeptical of claims about international cooperation when its fundamental rationales are so 
elusive, and why we should challenge casual, rhetorical justifications. Only a more fundamental 
reconceptualization of the subject matter of international taxation can show us the true past and future 
grounds for international tax cooperation. 
I. Puzzling Rationales for New International Agreements  
 
 Explanations of the recent momentum for international tax cooperation commonly refer to the 
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, launched in 2013, as a predecessor, from which 
the OECD’s current Two Pillar Blueprint evolved.31 However, narratives about what the OECD and the 
major participants in the discussions it organized have done—and when—tend to shift, and are 
frequently revised to support teleological accounts of global agreement.32 They are thus not best 
understood as simple factual statements. Instead of studying the “key players” in past and proposed 
international tax agreements and their various pronouncements, it is useful instead to focus on a single 
question: if countries are cooperating in the international tax sphere now, what are they cooperating to 
achieve?  
 
                                                          
31 OECD July 2021 statement, supra note 6. The “Two Pillars” refer to a division of proposed topics for coordinated 
tax reform first set out by the OECD in January 2019 in a short policy note. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF 
THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY – POLICY NOTE (2019). That policy note was expanded to a slightly longer 
“Programme of Work” in May 2019, for discussion among countries participating in the OECD’s Inclusive 
Framework. OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE 
DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (2019) [hereinafter OECD 2019 Programme of Work]. The OECD released draft 
reports on Pillar One and Pillar Two in late 2019, and final reports in October 2020. See OECD, TAX CHALLENGES 
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – REPORT ON PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT (2020); OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION 
– REPORT ON PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT (2020) (hereinafter “Pillar One Blueprint” and “Pillar Two Blueprint”, respectively).  
32 For instance, a comprehensive treatment of the OECD’s initial BEPS project published in 2016 makes no mention 
of the Inclusive Framework—and rightly so, because the Inclusive Framework was not convened until 2016, after 
the OECD issued all of its recommendations (“action plans”) under the BEPS project. Itai Grinberg, The New 
International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016). However, since 2016, narratives about tax cooperation at 
the OECD usually imply that BEPS was developed within the Inclusive Framework. See, e.g. Mason, supra note 11. 
Similarly, a 2020 comprehensive review of the OECD’s attempt to broker new agreements after 2018 barely 
mentions Pillar Two. See Mason, supra note 11. This was understandable at the time it was published, as the 
significance of Pillar Two was widely regarded as secondary. Yet as discussed above in the Introduction and further 
in Part I.C infra, Pillar Two and the “global minimum tax” are now regarded as central to the OECD-sponsored 
agreement.     
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It turns out that three very different answers to this question have been circulating in the 
international tax community in the past few years. The differences among them are conspicuous. 
Moreover, each raises obvious puzzles, to which their proponents suggest little by way of response.   
 
A. “Scale without mass:” mode substitution in the services trade 
 
The first rationale for reforming international taxation that is frequently invoked by national and 
supra-national governments,33 the OECD,34 international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF),35 and some scholars36 is that technological changes allow MNCs to conduct 
remote business operations and establish substantial “economic presence” in many countries without 
traditional “physical presence”: “brick and mortar” businesses are increasingly being replaced by online 
transactions. A core phrase that captures this phenomenon, made prominent by the OECD’s March 2018 
Interim Report on Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation, is “scale without mass.”37 Proponents of 
global reform claim that these changes diminish countries’ ability to tax foreign MNCs under the 
corporate income tax (CIT), because under traditional CIT rules, the presence of a subsidiary, branch or 
some other form of “permanent establishment” (“PE”) is required for a country to tax foreign MNE 
profit.38 CIT rules therefore must be revised to better enable countries to tax foreign MNCs doing 
business “in them” (but remotely).  
 
Given the title of the OECD’s current tax project (i.e. to “Address the Tax Challenges Arising from 
the Digitalisation of the Economy”), this rationale would appear to be critical to current discussions of 
international tax cooperation. Even so, the implied needs for coordination seem to be only moderate 
and indirect. Two such needs have been emphasized. First, rules that limit and allocate taxing rights 
based on PE and related concepts are generally incorporated in bilateral tax treaties. Treaties thus need 
to be revised to loosen the restrictions such rules impose on new CIT policies.39 In other words, 
coordination is needed to preserve the treaty legal order in the face of changing policies. Second, and 
                                                          
33 See e.g., HM TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: POSITION PAPER UPDATE (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/corp
orate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Corporate Tax Update]; HM TREASURY, 
DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: CONSULTATION (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/754975/Digit
al_Services_Tax_-_Consultation_Document_FINAL_PDF.pdf; see Eur. Comm’n, Proposal for a Council Directive 
Laying Down Rules Relating to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 
21, 2018) (hereinafter EU SDP Proposal); Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital 
Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, COM (2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 
2018) [hereinafter EU DST Proposal]. 
34 OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter OECD 
2015 Final Report].  
35 IMF, Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, at 15-16, Policy Paper No. 19/007 (Mar. 2019). 
36 MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX ET AL., TAXING PROFIT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2021). 
37 OECD 2018 Report, supra note 17, at 51-59. 
38 A brief summary of the logic of “permanent establishment” rules is given in Wei Cui, The Superiority of the 
Digital Services Tax over ‘Significant Digital Presence’ Proposals, 72:4 NAT’L TAX J 839 (2019).  
39 See EU SDP Proposal, supra note 33 for a discussion of this point. Moreover, because bilateral tax treaties are 
said to take time to renegotiate—and some countries may be unwilling to do so—it is argued that multilateral 
agreements are a more efficient way for countries willing to revise their treaties to do so, simultaneously with 
many treaty partners, in analogy to the “multilateral instrument” used in the OECD’s earlier BEPS project. OECD, 




more vaguely, it is suggested that any policy change that expands a country’ ability to tax foreign MNC 
profit may create the risk of “double taxation.” Commentators on international taxation tend to espouse 
the view that any such “risk”—regardless of its prevalence and magnitude—immediately creates a need 
for international coordination, even beyond the amendment of bilateral treaties.     
 
Such quick and casual claims about the need for international coordination are common in 
international taxation, notwithstanding the questionable inferences underlying them.40  However, even 
without scrutinizing these inferences, the basic factual premise concerning the changing nature of MNC 
activities should be examined. Notably, the paradigmatic examples that the OECD and others cite for the 
“challenges arising from the digital economy” are almost uniformly in the services sector: distribution 
(e.g. online retail like Amazon and content distribution such as Netflix and Spotify), advertising (Google 
and Facebook), transportation and lodging (Uber and AirBnB), business services (AWS, Apple), and so 
on. In the standard terminology of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), what the 
international tax community appears to be concerned about is the ascendance of “Mode 1” service 
trade at the expense of “Mode 3” trade.  
 
GATS categorizes services trade into four modes of supply: 
1. Cross-border supply (Mode 1): services supplied from the territory of one country into the 
territory of another, such as through the internet. 
2. Consumption abroad (Mode 2): services provided in the territory of one country to a consumer 
of another country, such as tourism. 
3. Commercial presence (Mode 3): services delivered by a supplier of one country through 
commercial presence—such as a controlled affiliate or a branch—in the territory of another. 
4. Presence of natural persons (Mode 4): a supplier of one country provides services through the 
presence of natural persons in the territory of another, such as consultants. 
 
The first rationale for coordinated change in international tax, in other words, is based on the 
premises that traditional CIT rules taxed mainly Mode 3 service trade, and that Mode 3 service trade is 
being significantly replaced by Mode 1 trade.   
 
However, even though the international tax community has taken this latter premise as a self-
evident truth, trade statistics immediately cast doubt on it. According to the WTO 2019 World Trade 
Report, Mode 3 remains the dominant mode for trading services globally—its value of US$ 7.8 trillion in 
2017 represented 58.9% of global services trade—and this pattern has essentially stayed unchanged 
since 2005. Mode 1 services trade, including through electronic means, totaled US$ 3.7 trillion in 2017 
with a 27.7% share. The decline in the share of Mode 3 services trade among developed economies 
between 2005 and 2017 is quite small (see upper right panel in Figure 1), and the increase of Mode 1 
services trade even smaller. In fact, during the same period, for five of the world’s leading developing 
economies in terms of services trade—China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, and South Korea—there was 
a rapid rise in the relative importance of Mode 3 trade and a large decline for Mode 1 (see upper left 
panel in Figure 1).41 In general, there is tremendous heterogeneity among countries in what and how 
many services they import and export, and correspondingly, in what modes. 
 
                                                          
40 See Cui, supra note 38, for arguments that coordination conventions—without the need for explicit 
agreements—are readily available for taxes imposed on location-specific rent.  
41 Growth of the share of Mode 3 services is also observed for France for 2005-2011. Giuseppe Berlingieri et al., 
Service offshoring and export experience, VOX EU CEPR (Jul. 28, 2021).  
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Not only is the extent of Mode-3-to-Mode-1 substitution heterogenous across countries, it is 
also heterogenous across sectors. This is because Mode 3 trade is dominated by a few sectors (see 
Figure 2). Distribution services and financial services are the largest traded services globally, accounting 
for 19.9% and 18.6% of total services trade in 2017. Additionally, 77% of financial services and over 70% 
of distribution services were traded through foreign affiliates. It appears that the trend of Mode-3-to-
Mode-1 substitution is pronounced (and only for some countries) mainly in these sectors.43 However, 
the financial services industry is not at the center of the current debate about reforming international 
income taxation; financial firms have been carved out of Pillar One of the OECD proposal and the 
traditional rules will be preserved for this sector.44 At the same time, transport and tourism (the 4th and 
5th largest categories of services trade) are unlikely to convert to Mode 1, while construction (the 8th 
largest category) is dominated by Mode 3 supply. 
 
It is also notable that trade in information and communication technology (ICT) services is the 
third largest sector of global services trade after distribution and financial services, and one of the 
fastest growing. However, this sector never relied heavily on Mode 3 supply, having always been 
dominated by Mode 1 (and Mode 4) supply.45 In other words, although Mode 1 services trade may be 
                                                          
42 WTO, World Trade Report 2019: The Future of Services Trade, at 34 (2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/00_wtr19_e.pdf [hereinafter WTO 2019 Report]. 
43 According to the WTO 2019 report, supra note 42, the share of financial services exported by EU-controlled 
affiliates in 2017 was 6 percentage points lower than in 2005, similar to development in the United States. 
Meanwhile, U.S. financial services exports in Mode 1 almost tripled compared with 2005.  
44 OECD July 2021 statement, supra note 6.  
45 Moreover, the EU and India, not the U.S., are the two largest global exporters of computer services and related 
activities (IT services). WTO 2019 Report, supra note 42, at 28. 
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rapidly growing, it is not the case that such growth comes at the expense of traditional Mode 3 trade. 
Mode 1 and Mode 3 trade can even be complements in some sectors, rather than substitutes.46   
 
Figure 2 Leading sectors in global services trade47 
 
 
Overall, there are very substantial heterogeneities across countries and sectors in the services 
trade. There is no evidence that significant Mode-3-to-Mode-1 substitution is happening for the majority 
of countries (or even the majority of advanced economies), or that many countries are losing tax 
revenue as a result of such substitution.  What, then, is the common problem of international taxation 
to be solved through collective action?  
 
This question is made even more striking if one adopts a purported principle of international tax 
design that the OECD has occasionally advocated: the same tax rules must apply to different types of 
international commerce, and no special tax regime should be applied to the “digital economy.”48 Many 
commentators—and governments including the U.S.—have invoked this principle of “no ring-fencing” to 
criticize new international tax rules that apply only to particular industries.49 But without taking an 
industry-specific perspective, the problem of remote business models replacing “brick and mortar” 
physical presence would simply disappear.50  
 
We thus have a puzzle: what are pronounced to be major “challenges arising from the 
digitalization of the economy” may have no robust factual basis. It is important to acknowledge that this 
                                                          
46 Id. at 94. 
47 Id. at 25. 
48 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 4 (1998); OECD 2015 
Final Report, supra note 34, at 142; OECD 2019 Programme of Work, supra note 31, at 26. 
49 Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Wars: How to End the Conflict over Taxing Global Digital Commerce, 17:2 BERKELEY BUS. L. 
J. 353 (2020); UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER), REPORT ON FRANCE’S 
DIGITAL SERVICES TAX PREPARED IN THE INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2019) (hereinafter USTR 
Report on French DST)  
50 As some scholars have pointed out, because the efficient design of tax policies relies on discriminating between 
different types of transactions (e.g. in terms of their responsiveness to tax changes), the principle of “no ring-
fencing” goes against efficiency considerations, rather than enhancing efficiency. See Michael J. Graetz, The David 
R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory 
Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 305 (2001).   
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puzzle characterizes not only inter-governmental discussions organized by the OECD, but also other 
recent international initiatives. In fact, it is unclear that the OECD would have pursued its current 
initiative if the European Council (EC) had not put forward two draft “directives” in March 2018 to 
consider for adoption within the European Union.51 These two draft directives—one for a set of 
coordinated digital services taxes (DSTs) within the EU52 and another for collective amendments of 
income tax treaties by EU member countries53—specifically claimed to provide “interim” and “long-
term” solutions to the problem of taxing MNCs operating at “scale without mass.” It was these EU 
initiatives (and a similar proposal made by the UK government54) that prompted the OECD to issue its 
“interim report” on taxation in the digital economy in March 2018. More significantly, it was the EC’s 
failure to secure consensus on its draft directives in November 2018 that resulted in the opportunity for 
the OECD to describe a new “program of work” in 2019.55 In any case, this rationale continues to be 
repeated. Yet it seems spurious and merely rhetorical, and does not identify genuine needs for global 
cooperation.   
 
B. Tax war and peace? 
 
A second rationale for international tax cooperation that has attained great prominence since 
2019 is that an OECD-brokered international tax agreement is needed to avert trade wars that would 
seriously damage the world economy. In November 2020, the OECD produced an economic impact 
assessment of its Two Pillar proposal, and asserted that the main case for the proposal rested on the 
undesirability of an alternative scenario, in which trade wars would reduce global GDP by up to 1% in a 
“worst-case” scenario.56 In the words of a prominent OECD official, “any agreement is better than no 
agreement.”57 By implication, if this were not a matter of war and peace, countries would face no urgent 
need to cooperate on international tax. 
 
The threatened “trade wars” came about in the following way. As mentioned above, the EC 
proposed coordinated adoptions of DSTs within the EU in 2018. However, because tax policy decisions 
at the EC require unanimity, and because a number of EU member states objected to a European DST, 
the EC proposal was not enacted. Several European countries led by France, as well as Britain, 
subsequently legislated their own DSTs.58 These domestically-enacted DSTs came to be known as the 
“unilateral measures.”59 The U.S. believed that these DSTs were specifically targeted at U.S. tech 
companies and were discriminatory in nature, and the Office of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under 
the Trump Administration initiated investigations against DST-imposing countries under Section 301 of 
                                                          
51 EC DST Proposal and EC SDP Proposal, supra note 33.  
52 See Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense, 73(1) TAX L. REV. 69 (2019). 
53 See Cui, supra note 38. 
54 2018 Corporate Tax Update, supra note 33. 
55 Any account by which the OECD’s “Two-Pillar Solution” simply evolved or continued from the earlier BEPS 
project thus critically hides the extent to which the OECD’s project was a reaction to competing multilateral 
initiatives.       
56 OECD 2020 Impact Assessment, supra note 19, at 11, 183-187.  
57 Stephanie Soong Johnston, Countries Closer Than Ever to Tax Reform Deal, Saint-Amans Says, TAX NOTES FED., 
(Jun. 15, 2021) (citing Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Speech 
at BFM Business regarding progress towards a new international tax reform agreement (Jun. 14, 2021)).  
58 Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax on the Verge of Implementation, 67:4 CAN. TAX J. 1135 (2019). 
59 This loaded label implies that most tax policy measures that apply to MNCs are adopted through bilateral or 
multilateral agreement, which is clearly false. See Wei Cui, What Is Unilateralism in International Taxation?, 114 
AJIL UNBOUND 260, 260-64 (2020). 
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the Trade Act of 1974.60 The USTR authorized retaliatory tariffs against France in 2020, and against the 
U.K., Austria, India, Italy, Spain and Turkey61 under the Biden Administration in 2021. However, the U.S. 
has voluntarily suspended all of its retaliatory tariffs currently, because the OECD proposes that all 
countries withdraw their DSTs, once an international tax agreement is reached.62 If the OECD agreement 
were to fail and if the U.S. were to proceed with its retaliatory tariffs against DST-imposing countries, 
trade wars could break out, as these countries are likely to mount retaliatory tariffs against the U.S.63  
 
It is important to note that some of the major advocates for international agreements in 2021—
including especially the U.S., France, and the U.K.—are would-be belligerents in this story of potential 
trade wars. Yet they themselves do not claim that averting trade wars is the main reason for 
international agreement: instead, they appeal to either the rationale based on the changing modes of 
global commerce discussed above, or the need to end tax competition and corporate tax avoidance 
(discussed in Part I.C). This discrepancy is highly significant. One might argue that the OECD is more 
honest about the true nature of the proposed international agreement when it continues to emphasize 
the averting-trade-war rationale for the agreement, because there would likely be no international 
agreement if countries do not commit to withdrawing or refraining from imposing DSTs.64 To put it 
differently, whatever the appeals of the other policy objectives for international cooperation, the 
international agreement currently proposed by the OECD, at its core, is an agreement that DSTs should 
not be used to advance these objectives. 
 
 Yet the averting-trade-war rationale for international cooperation is highly unusual even on its 
face. As far as anyone can tell, all of the “trade wars” that the OECD warns about involve a single 
common belligerent, the U.S. No country is entering into trade wars against any other.65 This fact is 
acknowledged and incorporated in an extraordinary way into the OECD’s purported simulation of the 
consequences of the failure of international agreement. In the OECD’s simulation of trade wars between 
a “narrow” group of countries and the U.S.,66 over 30 countries that either had adopted a DST or 
reportedly were considering DST adoption as of 2020 are assumed to (i) tax all digital imports from the 
U.S., (ii) be subjected to either a proportionate retaliatory tariff or a tariff that is 5 times the amounts of 
DSTs by the U.S., and (iii) enact proportionate counter-tariffs against the U.S for these retaliatory tariffs. 
                                                          
60 ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46604, SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND 
USE 34-38 (2020).  
61 USTR Announces, and Immediately Suspends, Tariffs in Section 301 Digital Services Taxes Investigations, OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REP.. (Jun. 2, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2021/june/ustr-announces-and-immediately-suspends-tariffs-section-301-digital-services-taxes-
investigations.  
62 OECD July 2021 Statement, supra note 6.  
63 See text to infra notes 87 for the potential retaliatory measures that the DST-imposing countries may adopt. 
Some commentators on the DST disputes assert that the adoptions of DSTs are initiations of “tax wars” in 
themselves. See, e.g. Cockfield, supra note 48; Ed. Bd., France Starts a Digital Tax War, WALL ST. J. OPINION (Jul. 16, 
2019, 7:07 PM ET). Such labelling, however, appears highly subjective and selective, as it implies that any tax 
adopted by one country that other countries do not like amounts to a declaration of “war” that needs to be 
resolved through international agreements. 
64 The withdrawal of DSTs is a central condition of the OECD’s Pillar One proposal. OECD July 2021 Statement, 
supra note 6.  
65 Even the U.S. government itself acknowledges that the DSTs imposed by France and other countries may be 
applicable to non-U.S. MNCs. USTR Report on French DST, supra note 49, at 26-27. No country other than the U.S. 
claims that these DST-imposing countries have initiated tax or trade wars against them.   
66 OECD 2020 Impact Assessment, supra note 19, at 184-186. 
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In a “worst case” scenario, all countries in the world except for China and Hong Kong would adopt 
DSTs;67 the U.S. would mount retaliatory tariffs against all of them (up to 5 times the value of DSTs); and 
all of them would mount counter-tariffs against the U.S. It is these hyperbolic scenarios of the U.S. 
waging war against the rest of the world that generate the OECD’s dire predictions of the consequences 
of countries failing to agree on the OECD’s proposals.68  
 
What the OECD proposes, in other words, is that even if all countries in the world (other than 
the U.S. and China) are willing to adopt DSTs, DSTs should still be preempted because the U.S. objects to 
them. This justification for international tax cooperation may seem farfetched—even perverse. But it 
has gone virtually unchallenged in recent reports and commentaries on international tax cooperation, 
and is often repeated. Therefore, it is worthwhile to elaborate on at least four reasons why the 
justification is problematic.  
 
First, the justification is clearly not to be interpreted as claiming that international tax 
agreements are needed to resolve actual trade tensions. If actual trade tensions were at stake, then the 
justification would fail because it ignores the obvious point that the potential “belligerents” in trade 
wars should resolve their conflicts themselves, without dragging in the rest of the world. For example, 
the U.S. under the Trump Administration had also authorized Section 301 retaliatory tariffs against 
China for the latter’s purported violations of its WTO obligations69—a trade war that continues under 
the Biden Administration. Currently, no country or international organization proposes that a new 
multilateral agreement of any sort should be negotiated to end the U.S.-China trade war. Similarly, the 
Trump Administration had also authorized Section 301 retaliatory tariffs against the EU in connection 
with the longstanding Large Civil Aircraft dispute.70 In June 2021, the U.S. and EU agreed to a truce in 
their reciprocal retaliations in the dispute, again without the involvement of other countries.71 The 
amount of tariffs imposed in both the China-U.S. trade war and the reciprocal retaliations in the U.S.-EU 
Large Civil Aircraft dispute are significantly larger in magnitude than the Section 301 tariffs that the 
USTR has actually planned against DST-imposing countries.72 A rationale for a global tax agreement 
based on DST-induced trade tensions therefore emerges only if the U.S. is assumed to be “retaliating” 
against almost the entire world. In reality, the U.S.’s Section 301 tariffs, adopted in 2020 and 2021 
against seven DST-imposing countries, are likely adopted to deter other countries from DST adoption. If 
Section 301 tariffs have to be levied against over 30 countries (the “narrow” group contemplated by the 
OECD), let alone the “rest of the world,” this deterrence strategy would have already utterly failed.  
 
 Second, the U.S.’s imposition of Section 301 tariffs against DST-imposing countries likely violates 
its WTO obligations. In this regard, the Section 301 tariffs against France and other DST-imposing 
countries resemble the Section 301 tariffs that the U.S. has levied on Chinese imports since 2018 (which 
                                                          
67 China and Hong Kong are assumed to neither enact DSTs nor retaliate against them.  
68 OECD 2020 Impact Assessment, supra note 19, at 186-187.  
69 SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 60, at 28-31; Alan O. Sykes, The Law and Economics of “Forced” Technology Transfer 
and Its Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the U.S.–China Trade War), 13:1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 127 
(2021).  
70 SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 60 at 31-34.  
71 Robert Goulder, The Transatlantic Détente Is Simple as A-B-C: Airbus, Boeing, and China, 102 TAX NOTES INT’L 1877 
(2021).   
72 In 2017, $370 billion of U.S.-China trade was affected by the U.S.’s Section 301 tariffs. In 2019, the U.S. imposed 
tariffs on $7.5 billion of imports from the EU in the Large Civil Aircraft dispute. By comparison, The U.S.’s Section 
301 tariffs against France in retaliation for the DST covered $1.3 billion of French imports. SCHWARZENBERG, supra 
note 60, at 29, 33, and 35.  
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have been found to breach WTO law),73 and differ from the U.S. tariffs against the EU in the Large Civil 
Aircraft dispute (as the latter are authorized by the WTO).74 Specifically, the USTR does not allege that 
the DSTs being investigated are in violation of existing international agreements (e.g. WTO rules, 
regional trade agreements, bilateral tax treaties, etc.). It in effect acknowledges that DSTs are 
unconstrained by trade agreements.75 Instead, the USTR’s determination is simply that DSTs 
“[discriminate] against major U.S. digital companies and [are] inconsistent with prevailing international 
tax policy principles.”76 The USTR’s determination under such vague criteria is bound by no rule of law.77 
However, the U.S.’s announced retaliatory tariffs on imported goods from France and other DST-
imposing countries are clearly disciplined by the WTO. It is not only the European Union’s view that such 
tariffs would violate U.S. WTO obligations:78 U.S. legal scholars and U.S. government agencies 
themselves have questioned the WTO-compatibility of many Section 301 tariffs.79  
 
 To invoke the U.S. Section 301 tariffs against a large number of countries as the basis of a new 
international tax agreement therefore assumes the U.S.’s entitlement to violate WTO law. It is not clear 
how a country willing to breach international obligations towards other countries under an existing (and 
significant) cooperative regime can commit itself to cooperation in a new regime that is the direct result 
of such a breach. Moreover, what the OECD effectively claims is that it should be the site of 
international negotiations to prevent disputes that, under existing international law, are expected to be 
                                                          
73 In September 2020, a WTO panel found the U.S.’s imposition of Section 301 tariffs against China since 2018 was 
in violation of WTO rules. Kenneth Rapoza, What the WTO Ruling Against Trump’s China Tariffs Means for a 
Potential President Biden, FORBES (Sep. 16, 2020, 10:00 am EDT).   
74 SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 60, at 32.  
75 For a detailed analysis of DST compatibility with trade agreements, see Chris Noonan & Victoria Plekhanova, 
Taxation of Digital Services Under Trade Agreements, 23:4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1015 (2020). 
76 See, Office of U.S. Trade Rep., Notice of Determination and Request for Comments Concerning Action Pursuant to 
Section 301: France’s Digital Services Tax, 84:235 FED. REG. 66956 (Dec. 6, 2019). 
77 U.S. legal scholars have long questioned the lack of constraint on the U.S. government under the 
“reasonableness” standard under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. See David M. Pedley, A Definition for 
“Unreasonable” in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Consideration of the United States – Thailand Tobacco 
Dispute, 5 EMORY INT’L REV. 285 (1991); Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L. J. 1122 (1987). 
78 Jakob Hanke Vela, EU looks to target Big Tech in trade war with America, POLITICO (Jul. 20, 2020, 7:34 AM EDT).  
79 See, e.g. SCHWARZENBERG, supra note 60, at 38 (“Should the United States impose retaliatory trade measures [in 
connection with DSTs], the affected parties could pursue WTO dispute settlement or retaliate by targeting U.S. 
exports”); Colin Patch, A Unilateral President vs. A Multilateral Trade Organization: Ethical Implications in the 
Ongoing Trade War, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 883 (2019) (arguing that Trump’s Section 301 tariffs against China are 
WTO-incompatible and undermines the international legal order); C. O’Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: 
Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANAT’L L. 209 (1997).  
16 
 
resolved through the WTO.80 One is supposed to believe that nations could resolve their disputes simply 
by switching from one international forum to another.81  
 
 Third, the OECD’s neglect of the fact that U.S. Section 301 tariffs against DST-imposing countries 
violate WTO law also betrays a lack of understanding that tariffs can and are used not just to wage trade 
wars, but to enforce international agreements. No supra-national government authority, including the 
WTO, is able to enforce trade agreements against their signatories: the enforcement must come from 
other signatories to these agreements.82 When one signatory is found to violate its WTO obligations, 
authorized retaliations by others serve to enforce such obligations (or compensate the others for such 
violations). For example, when the U.S. and EU levied retaliatory tariffs against one another in the Large 
Civil Aircraft dispute, both acted with WTO authorization: the WTO had determined that each side had 
violated WTO law by adopting certain export subsidy policies. It would be mistaken to describe this as a 
scenario where “war” broke out, existing international agreements became defunct, and a new 
agreement needed to be negotiated. Instead, the prior trade agreement was enforced, and if the parties 
could not come to a resolution, the new status quo, with new WTO-authorized tariffs on both sides, was 
regarded as a renegotiated outcome.83  
 
When the U.S. imposes Section 301 tariffs in violation of its WTO obligations, the other 
countries are entitled to seek remedy within the WTO framework.84 Even a WTO ruling against the U.S., 
however, would have no effect in itself, if the countries injured by U.S. tariffs could not mount counter-
tariffs. It is tariffs authorized by the WTO, and other WTO-compliant measures to counter trade policies 
that violate WTO agreements (such as the U.S. Section 301 tariffs), that enforce such international 
agreements. In portraying tariffs and counter-tariffs as a matter of war, and in portraying the removal of 
such tariffs and counter-tariffs as peaceful cooperation—all without distinguishing between tariff 
measures that violate and those that enforce trade agreements—the OECD lays bare a big gap in its 
proposal for international tax agreement, namely what would constitute enforcement of the 
agreements.   
 
 To summarize these first three objections: the worst-case scenario for the global economy 
invoked by the OECD is one where, putting China and Hong Kong aside, every country is at peace with 
every other except the U.S.; the U.S. is at war with every other country; the U.S. violates its WTO 
                                                          
80 Some tax scholars suggest that because tax matters are involved, the dispute over the DST should be resolved 
through the OECD rather than the WTO. Such a claim, however, ignores the fact that the WTO agreements contain 
only specific carveouts for tax measures. Unless these carveouts apply, there is no ground for claiming that WTO 
obligations are inapplicable to disputes about tax policies. Indeed, the U.S. went through and lost a lengthy GATT 
dispute with the EU concerning its income tax policies. See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31660, A 
HISTORY OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL INCOME (ETI) AND FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION (FSC) EXPORT TAX-BENEFIT CONTROVERSY 
(2006). 
81 It is also unclear how the Biden Administration’s continued threat of Section 301 tariffs that breach WTO rules 
can be viewed as multilateralist and cooperative in nature. David Lawder, U.S. sets and suspends tariffs on six 
countries over digital taxes, REUTERS (Jun. 2, 2021, 12:34 PM PDT).   
82 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The World Trade Organization, Theory and Practice, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 223, 
248-249 (2010).   
83 See Alan Sykes, International Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 757, 800-801 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
84 The intended EU response to U.S. retaliatory tariffs against any EU-member country that imposed the DST was 
to object to such tariffs at the WTO. Matt Thompson, EU to Boost Trade Sanctions Given Possible Digital Tax Spat, 
LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2020). 
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obligations in respect of all other WTO signatories; and every other country is enforcing WTO obligations 
against the U.S. It would seem that this is an unmitigated disaster for the U.S., while the rest of the 
world continues to cooperate under the WTO. Instead, the OECD presents it as a disaster for the world, 
and as the end of international cooperation.  
 
In view of the extraordinariness of this proposal, it is useful to consider, fourth and finally, how 
likely in reality trade wars would erupt around DSTs and remain uncontained without international 
agreement. The U.S. suffered significant damage from the trade war Trump initiated against China. 
Though the U.S. is China’s largest trading partner, its presumed monopsony power did not prevent most 
of the burden of the U.S. tariffs from being passed onto U.S. consumers.85 The U.S. strategy for 
retaliating against DSTs similarly comprises high-rate tariffs on goods exports to the U.S. Thus, even 
without considering the possibility of WTO-authorized or WTO-compatible counter-tariffs adopted by 
other countries, the U.S. would need to be cautious in actually levying the tariffs. Moreover, there are 
powerful asymmetries between the U.S. and the DST-imposing countries it may retaliate against.  For 
one, the DST, conceived as a tariff on zero-marginal cost digital services, may be adopted by many small 
countries, some of which may not even have sufficient goods exports to the U.S. for the latter to impose 
tariffs on.86 For another, the press reported that in light of the likelihood that WTO dispute resolution 
mechanisms might remain paralyzed in the near future, the EU was also crafting a set of WTO-compliant 
policies that would tax or otherwise restrict U.S. exports of a broader range of services and intellectual 
property licenses to Europe.87 It is such a set of policies—permitted or simply undisciplined by the 
WTO—that would constitute the European “belligerents’” responses to the trade wars started by the 
U.S. For its war threat to be credible, the U.S. needs to have a response to this next stage of escalation.   
 
Overall, the second rationale for international tax cooperation emphasized by the OECD takes 
the U.S.’s entitlement, willingness and ability to carry out trade wars against a large number of countries 
for granted. Even though its assumptions are obviously implausible—and even though it betrays a 
neglect and misunderstanding of major existing institutions of international cooperation under the WTO 
regime—it is a rationale that commentators on the OECD proposals have largely acquiesced to. Most 
importantly, this rationale captures an essential component of the proposed international agreement—
the withdrawal of DSTs—currently sponsored by the G-7, G-20 and the OECD in 2021. Instead of 
international cooperation, one country seems to have successfully asserted power over others. That 
nations “cooperate” this way deserves to be seen as a puzzle. 
 
C. Ending MNC avoidance and tax (and subsidy) competitions?  
 
The case for global tax cooperation has been substantially recast in 2021, first by the Biden 
Administration, then as a result of the G7/G20 accord on a “global minimum tax.” Instead of addressing 
new policy challenges arising from Mode-1-for-Mode-3 substitution in the services trade, the G7 called 
                                                          
85 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding & David E. Weinstein, The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare, 33:4 
J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (2019); Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding & David E. Weinstein, Who’s paying for the US tariffs? A 
longer-term perspective, 110 A.E.A. PAPERS & PROC. 541 (2020). 
86 For a discussion of the limited retaliation strategies of countries exporting zero-marginal-cost digital services, see 
WOLFRAM RICHTER, THE TAXATION OF DIGITAL SERVICES AS A RENT-EXTRACTING POLICY, DISCUSSION PAPER (2021). To follow the 
unfortunate war metaphor, the U.S. Section 301 tariffs are akin to aircraft carriers and ballistic missiles, whereas 
DSTs are analogous to drone strikes. 
87 Vela, supra note 78. 
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for reversing long-term declines in corporate tax rates.88 And while the OECD still seeks global 
endorsement of its reform blueprints as a matter of securing “tax peace,”89 no G7 or G20 country 
emphasizes this as the most important aspect of an OECD-facilitated agreement. Instead, they claim that 
the new agreement will end corporate tax competition and MNC tax avoidance. Yet the new rationale 
circulated in 2021 again rests on many claims brandished as self-evident, but which turn out to be 
problematic upon even a cursory examination. In fact, instead of enabling countries to tax MNCs more, 
the OECD’s proposals can easily be read as being in favor of MNCs. 
 
In particular, “Pillar Two” of the OECD proposal invites countries to cooperate on policies that 
they can easily and effectively adopt (and have adopted) on their own. The reason for coordinated 
rather than unilateral adoption, apparently, is to provide MNCs with “certainty” in the application of 
anti-avoidance rules—which weakens rather than strengthens such rules. Likewise, “Pillar One” of the 
OECD proposals invites countries to agree on certain methods of taxing MNCs, to be applied only to a 
small number of corporate groups. The proposal’s real linchpin, however, is securing the withdrawal of 
DSTs—a collective agreement to limit the taxation of MNCs.  
 
This subpart will briefly review these contentious aspects of the OECD proposals. But just as 
importantly, even abstracting from the OECD’s specific approach, there are more fundamental reasons 
why ending tax competition to attract foreign investment or MNC headquarters cannot serve as goals of 
global cooperation. This makes it less surprising that the OECD proposal does not serve such goals.    
 
1. “Agreeing” to a “global minimum tax” 
 
The first thing to know about the OECD’s proposed “Two Pillar Solution” (endorsed by the G20 
in July 2021) is that nowhere in it are countries required to adopt a minimum CIT rate. There is thus a 
glaring discrepancy between what politicians and the press claim countries have agreed to and the plain 
language of the proposed agreement. “Pillar Two” of the OECD proposal contains the main provisions 
that refer to a minimum tax rate, but they are better described as anti-avoidance rules: indeed, the 
OECD called this part of its proposal the “Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Proposal” before the “global 
minimum tax” label began to be used in 2021.  
 
In this proposal, the OECD makes two main recommendations.90 First, countries with MNC 
headquarters should subject the companies’ foreign income (including income earned by foreign 
subsidiaries) to an additional tax, if such income is subject to lower-than-minimum tax rates elsewhere. 
If a country adopts this recommendation—the so-called “Income Inclusion Rule” (IIR)—in respect of 
headquartered MNCs, then it can be said to have ensured that the foreign income of such MNCs is 
subject to a combined tax rate of no less than the minimum.91 Second, countries are entitled to impose 
additional taxes on the payment of income made from them to persons in countries that subject such 
                                                          
88 Jeff Stein & Antonia Noori Farzan, G-7 countries reach agreement on 15 percent minimum global tax rate, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 5, 2021, 4:36 PM EDT). 
89 Nana Ama Sarfo, The IMF’s Big Ideas for the Future of Corporate Taxation, 102 TAX NOTES INT’L 866 (2021).  
90 A third recommendation is called the “subject to tax rule,” which encourages countries to negotiate bilaterally 
such that one country can raise the tax imposed on payments made to the other country when the latter lowers its 
tax on such payments. It is thus similar to the “Undertaxed Payment Rule” discussed below, but implemented 
through tax treaty conventions and on a bilateral, rather than unilateral, basis. Pillar Two Blueprint, supra note 31, 
at 150-151.  
91 Pillar Two Blueprint, supra note 31, at __. The IIR minimum tax rate is agreed to be 15% in October 2021. 
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income to lower-than-minimum tax rates. If a country from which payments are made adopts this 
recommendation—the so-called “Undertaxed Payment Rule” (UTPR)—then it can be said to be trying to 
ensure that income arising from itself and accruing to foreigners is subject to a combined tax rate of no 
less than a minimum.92  However, neither countries adopting the IIR or UTPR nor any other country is 
asked to consider adopting a stand-alone CIT rate above a minimum rate, for income earned by its own 
corporations in its own territory. No country, that is, is restricted against adopting low CIT rates to entice 
MNCs to move their operations to it. 
 
Explaining how such a proposal amounts to a bid to end “tax competition” requires certain 
elaborate—and ultimately tenuous—narratives, usually omitted for the purposes of media sound bites. 
Such narratives involve claims about the purported effects of the two types of anti-avoidance rules, 
discussed further below. However, another basic point to note at the outset is that these rules represent 
a “common approach”: countries are not required to commit to their adoption in any global agreement. 
Instead, countries are to agree that if they were to adopt anti-avoidance rules of a sufficiently similar 
kind, they must adopt the OECD’s version of such rules.93 
 
The basic logic of the “Income Inclusion Rule” is thoroughly familiar to tax policymakers and 
practitioners around the world. Ever since the U.S. adopted comprehensive controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules in the early 1960s, many countries have enacted similar rules to prevent parent 
companies or individual shareholders residing in them from avoiding tax, by taxing undistributed income 
accruing to foreign subsidiaries that might be used by taxpayers to shelter income. The adoption of CFC 
rules has overwhelmingly taken the form of unilateral legislation, and the international tax community 
has widely accepted such non-coordination in CFC rule adoption.94 This is not just because CFC rules are 
generally believed to be effective even when unilaterally adopted95 and pose no harmful externalities:96 
CFC rules have also been used to serve policy purposes other than combatting tax avoidance. For 
example, the U.S.’ much admired CFC rules were first enacted in 1962,97 when the U.S. struggled to deal 
with a balance of payment crisis and explored all measures to bring capital back to itself.98 Similarly, the 
                                                          
92 Pillar Two Blueprint, supra note 31, at __. The UPTR minimum tax rate is agreed to be 9% in October 2021. 
93 Moreover, as a part of the international agreement, countries would agree not to object to others’ adoption of 
such anti-avoidance rules. OECD July 2021 Statement, supra note 6.  
94 Some scholars suggest that the U.S. acted as a leader in adopting such practices in the spirit of “constructive 
unilateralism.” See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Constructive Unilateralism: U.S. Leadership and International Taxation, 
42:2 Int’l Tax J. 17, 17-24 (2016). Others have called such mutual acceptance of unilateral legislation (of what are 
believed to be good international tax practices) “coordinated unilateralism.” Mason, supra note 11. 
95 See Dharmapala, supra note 12. For a summary of the unilateral introductions of CFC rules, see Johannes Voget, 
Relocation of Headquarters and International Taxation, 95 J PUB. ECON. 1067 (2011).  
96 As discussed further in Part II below, income taxation based on the residence of individual shareholders has long 
been regarded as the most efficient form of international taxation. See Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-
Efficient International Taxation, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 259 (2004); Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines, International 
Taxation, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1935 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein, eds., 2002); Alan J. Auerbach, 
Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 
837 (Stuart Adam et al., eds., 2010); Rachel Griffith, James R. Hines & Peter Birch Sørensen, International Capital 
Taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 914 (Stuart Adam et al., eds., 2010). 
97 Also known as the “Subpart F rules,” referring to Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  
98 President John F. Kennedy's Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, April 20th, 1961 (acknowledging that 
the policy motive for the CFC rules was not only limiting tax avoidance but “to stimulate our economy and our 
plant modernization, as well as ease our balance of payments deficit.”) As the U.S. balance of payment crisis 
worsened in the 1960s, it even temporarily adopted capital control and an embargo on net direct investment 
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Trump Administration introduced strengthened measures of U.S. residence-based taxation through the 
global intangible and low-taxed income (GILTI) regime in 2017, as part of a political agenda purporting to 
bring jobs back to America.99 The GILTI represents yet another variant of CFC rules (or what the OECD 
now calls IIR).100 In other words, countries may want to design their CFC rules to reflect their changing 
domestic policy needs (whether or not directly related to taxation). And in the past, governments rarely 
argued that CFC regimes’ effectiveness critically depends on collective adoption.  
 
What, then, is the necessity for global coordination in the adoption of the IIR?101 As noted 
above, the OECD actually does not expect all countries to commit to IIR adoption, consistent with the 
presumed feasibility of unilateral adoption. Instead, the OECD’s IIR represents a “common approach,” 
rather than being obligatory on participants in the negotiations.102 Yet the complexity of OECD’s Pillar 
Two blueprint mainly issues from the premise that countries follow a coordination scheme in adopting 
the IIR. The OECD’s main justification for coordinated adoption is that it would create “certainty” for 
MNCs when many countries adopt anti-avoidance rules.103 The implication is that there is a high risk that 
MNCs would be taxed too much if IIR (i.e. CFC-like) rules were more widely adopted by countries acting 
on their own. Consistent with this basic objective, the OECD proposal contains extensive “substance-
based carveouts,” rules concerning “excluded entities,” and priority ordering in the imposition of the 
IIR,104 all of which aim to limit the IIR’s application.      
 
If, however, no or few countries are specifically enabled to adopt IIR (i.e. CFC-like) rules by 
global coordination, and the main case for coordination is to limit the impact of the adoption of such 
rules on MNCs, it is clearly misleading to claim that the goal of new global tax cooperation is to end MNC 
tax avoidance. Indeed, in the tax profession, “certainty” is often a code word for narrowly drafted rules 
that taxpayers can plan around.105 Extensive legal scholarship has convincingly argued that black-and-
white rules regarded as providing “certainty” to taxpayers yield weaker deterrence effects against tax 
avoiders.106 If “certainty” is the main benefit of global cooperation in supporting OECD’s Pillar Two 
proposal, one must then conclude that the cooperation is mainly in favor of MNCs, not governments. 
 
 The second major component of the OECD’s Pillar Two recommendations, the UTPR, differs 
from the IIR in several respects relevant to the idea of cooperation. First, UTPR-like rules have rarely 
been adopted before: instead of identifying particular types of transactional structures as prone to being 
                                                          
outflows to continental Europe. Atish R. Ghosh and Mahvash S. Qureshi, What’s in a Name? That Which We Call 
Capital Controls 18-19 (IMF, Working Paper WP/16/25, 2016). 
99 Rebecca M. Kysar, Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International Tax Regime, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 339 (2018). 
100 U.S. tax commentators have argued that any variant of GILTI, even if modified from its current form pursuant to 
new legislation to be secured by the Biden Administration, will need to be accepted by the OECD as compatible 
with Pillar Two. [Cite.]  
101 Some scholars have suggested that coordinated adoption of CFC rules is necessary to prevent competition for 
corporate headquarters. I discuss this in Part I.C.3 infra.  
102 OECD July 2021 Statement, supra note 6. 
103 Pillar Two Blueprint, supra note 31, at __.  
104 Such ordering rules are relevant to tiered corporate structures in which multiple holding companies may be 
affiliated with different countries, all of which are entitled to impose IIR. 
105 Tax advisors around the world have already extensively analyzed the OECD’s Pillar Two proposal, to assure 
clients of the limited changes it brings, and to analyze the tax planning techniques either precluded or left open. 
See, e.g. KPMG, KMPG REPORT: OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON BEPS 2.0 (Jul. 2, 2021).  




used for tax avoidance,107 the UTPR recommends higher taxation, by the country from which payments 
are made, on payments to any recipient located in a country that taxes the receipt of such payments at 
a lower-than-minimum tax. Because of the lack of prior precedents,108 it is difficult to say, with 
confidence, whether this will be effective in curtailing tax avoidance.  
 
Second, even if the UTPR is potentially effective, the question can be raised as to why countries 
are better off collectively adopting it rather than unilaterally. Recall that the IIR—or, CFC-like rules—is 
traditionally regarded as a rule that countries have unilateral incentives to adopt.109 In contrast, 
although the UTPR might curtail MNC tax avoidance—MNCs would have less incentive to shift income to 
low-taxed jurisdictions—it could also increase the tax burden on real investment flows from countries 
with lower tax rates. The use of UTPR might thus divert foreign investment away from UTPR-adopting to 
UTPR-free countries. If this diversion effect is strong, the UTPR may not be unilaterally optimal to adopt. 
This might lead one to argue that if the world’s major investment destinations (e.g. the U.S., EU, other 
OECD countries, and China) all adopt the UTPR, the diversion of investment flow may be less marked. In 
other words, it may be much less costly for any country to adopt the UTPR if other countries also adopt 
it.  
 
 Yet this rationale for cooperation has been neither explicitly offered by the OECD nor elaborated 
on by any commentator. In fact, as noted before, the OECD does not require any country to commit to 
the adoption of UTPR—it only recommends a “common approach.” If collective action is necessary to 
enable UTPR adoption, then adoption will depend on whether countries can otherwise form a coalition, 
outside of the OECD-IF, that commits to collective adoption. Presumably, the OECD itself is not 
responsible for ensuring the formation of such a coalition. In that case, it is again unclear how Pillar Two 
generates reduction of MNC tax avoidance as a cooperative outcome. 
 
 The direct effect of international cooperation under Pillar Two on MNC tax avoidance is thus 
likely to be modest at best: it may even increase MNC tax avoidance if anti-avoidance policies that 
countries may themselves adopt are precluded by the OECD agreement. What effect will Pillar Two have 
on ending tax rate competition? After all, what grabbed news headlines in 2021 was the possibility that 
the decline of CIT rates around the world may be reversed, not that countries would adopt more 
“certain” anti-avoidance rules. How did the same OECD proposal, packaged as the “Global Anti-Base 
Erosion Proposal” before 2021, come to be taken as imposing a “global minimum tax”? 
 
 That transformation seems to have resulted from some heroic postulates, made mainly by U.S.-
based commentators and not by the OECD itself. It has been suggested that if just a few major capital-
exporting countries adopted stringent residence-country anti-avoidance rules (through the OECD’s IIR or 
even stronger domestic rules, such as the U.S. GILTI regime), then much of MNC tax planning using low- 
tax jurisdictions would cease to pay off. Consequently, countries would lose much of their ability to 
                                                          
107 Countries have long adopted a wide range of anti-avoidance rules to limit tax avoidance involving payments to 
foreign entities, such as rules limiting “earning stripping” (through the payment of interest or royalties to related 
parties), or rules limiting “treaty shopping” or the use of “conduit” entities. Many of these rules are viewed as 
effective even when unliterally adopted, which again suggests little gain from collective adoption. See Dharmapala 
supra note 12.  
108 Some have drawn analogies between the UTPR and the Base Erosion and Anti-Avoidance Tax (BEAT), which the 
U.S. adopted under the Trump Administration. The BEAT imposes a minimum tax on profits earned in the U.S. by 
foreign investors by denying the effect of deductions of payments made to related parties. However, the BEAT is 
not based on the tax rate imposed by the payment recipients’ country.      
109 Gordon & Hines, supra note 96, at __.  
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attract investment and profit-shifting through low taxes. It is speculated that this would lead some 
countries to stop pursuing low-tax strategies.110 Similarly, it has been speculated that given the U.S.’ 
unique attraction as an investment destination, even the U.S. acting alone could neutralize much MNC 
tax planning by denying deductions for all payments made from the U.S. to low-tax countries.111 If a 
small number of other countries form a coalition with the U.S. to enact similar rules—which the 
international community would accept by endorsing UPTR regimes as legitimate—then many tax 
planning structures using low-tax jurisdictions may again unwind. It is postulated that this would again 
lead many low-tax jurisdictions to raise their tax rates. 112 
 
 These narratives have barely been articulated or defended by either the advocates of or 
commentators on the “global minimum tax.” Three comments are sufficient to show why they are 
problematic. First, they make very strong assumptions—in particular, that the only reasons why 
countries have low CIT rates is that they help such countries attract MNC profit shifting.113 This is highly 
implausible in itself. Second, they suggest the following relation between the OECD’s Pillar Two proposal 
and the idea of a minimum CIT rate: even though the IIR and UTPR do not themselves dictate such a 
minimum tax rate, such a floor to CIT rates might emerge in reaction to collective adoptions of the anti-
avoidance rules. In other words, a global agreement on anti-avoidance rules, or the adoption of such 
rules by a small cartel of countries, might incentivize countries to raise their CIT rates even without a 
general agreement to adopt such a floor. The end of tax competition is not a matter of ex ante 
agreement, but a matter of subsequent strategic interaction.114 Putting the (im)plausibility of such 
narratives aside, it is clearly misleading to claim that ending tax competition (below the minimum tax 
rate) is what countries have agreed to,115 when commitment to adopting a minimum CIT rate is not even 
on the agenda.  
 
 Third, given that the OECD only recommends a common approach to the adoption of anti-
avoidance rules, what actual coalitions will form in the adoption of IIRs and UTPRs are yet to be seen. 
Claims in the summer of 2021 about what the G7, G20, and the over 130 IF countries have agreed to, 
therefore, are actually only claims about what some of these countries (or policy advocates in them) 
would like to see all countries agree to. A rhetorical strategy seems to have prevailed in the international 
sphere whereby simply saying that countries have agreed to something (i.e. coordinating to adopt anti-
avoidance rules), even when they have not, means that they will agree to that thing.  
 
                                                          
110 Richard Rubin, Global Tax Deal Holdouts Face Squeeze Under Biden Administration Plan, WALL ST. J, (Jun. 16, 
2021, 11:30 AM ET) (quoting Janet Yellen as claiming that the IIR will squeeze low tax country hold-outs); Jake 
Johnson, G7 countries reach agreement to set "global minimum" tax rate for multinational corporations, SALON 
(Jun. 7, 2021, 5:00 AM EDT) (quoting Gabriel Zucman for a similar claim).  
111 This is the characterization given of the SHIELD (“stopping harmful inversions and ending low-tax 
developments”) regime that the Biden Administration proposed through its Made in America Tax Plan.  
112 See, e.g. The New York Times Editorial Board, Make Tax-Dodging Companies Pay for Biden’s Infrastructure Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021).  
113 As a result of the “substance-based carveouts” in the OECD proposal, MNCs that have real productive activities 
in low-tax jurisdictions will not be affected by the IIR and UTPR.  
114 Since there is no ex ante agreement that all countries should adopt CIT rates no lower than a minimum, neither 
the IIR nor the UTPR can be said to be enforcing such an agreement.  
115 The OECD has claimed that tax competition above the agreed minimum tax rate (possibly of 15%) would still be 
permitted: this implies that tax competition below that rate is precluded—but no element of the OECD Two Pillar 
solution dictates such preclusion.    
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2. Ending a race to the top 
 
If the connection between the OECD’s Pillar Two proposal and the goal of ending tax 
competition and MNC tax avoidance is tenuous, the connection between the OECD’s Pillar One proposal 
to this goal is strained beyond recognition.116 Pillar One purportedly provides new types of taxing rights 
over MNC profits to countries that, due to constraints imposed by bilateral tax treaties, previously 
would not have been allowed to tax such profits.117 In particular, Pillar One envisions that countries may 
tax certain types of profits of certain MNCs as long as the MNCs generate sales revenue from them 
(rather than requiring subsidiaries and PEs). This purported thrust of Pillar One raises two sets of 
questions. First, why do countries need to be “granted” such taxing rights through a global agreement? 
If it is only rules in existing bilateral tax treaties that stand in the way of the claim and exercise of such 
rights, why can countries not just renegotiate tax treaties among themselves? Moreover, overrides of 
existing tax treaties occur with some frequency in international taxation; countries that want to break 
the constraints of existing agreements do not generally seek global permission for doing so. What is 
exceptional about the change proposed by Pillar One? Second, how does Pillar One contribute to the 
goal of ending tax competition and MNC tax avoidance? 
 
 One answer to the first set of questions is that some countries may not be able individually to 
renegotiate bilateral tax treaties. This is especially the case when the contracting states on the other 
side are unwilling and wield bargaining power. A multilateral agreement among many nations may allow 
some countries to band together and negotiate for terms that would not otherwise be obtainable. This 
logic is sound, but it in turn raises the following question: why would those countries that resist the 
renegotiation of existing bilateral tax treaties (e.g. those who prefer the status quo of tying taxing rights 
to MNCs’ subsidiaries or PEs) want to join a multilateral agreement to renegotiate the same treaties? 
The question is especially acute because multilateral bargaining has little precedence in international 
taxation.118 Therefore, if bilateral tax treaties cannot be renegotiated because of the unwillingness of 
some powerful countries, those powerful countries must be given clear incentives for joining a 
multilateral agreement.  
 
 In the case of the OECD’s Pillar One, it is no secret that, before 2021, the powerful country most 
resistant to joining such multilateral tax agreements was the U.S. Even in 2020, the U.S. did not believe 
that creating international taxing rights based on sales was in its interest,119 and it especially resisted 
proposals to apply such new methods to particular sectors (“ringfencing”) where its MNCs were 
dominant players.120 The main “inducement” offered by countries advocating for a new multilateral tax 
                                                          
116 Yet, the rigid language of international tax so easily lends itself to mechanical repetition without understanding 
that the disconnect has gone largely unnoticed by journalists. 
117 This proposal for creating new rights for taxing foreign MNCs without physical presence is largely justified on 
the ground of Mode-1-for-Mode-3 service trade substitution, discussed in Part I.A. 
118 Mason, supra note 11 acknowledges that the OECD historically has not been an institution for reaching 
collective agreements on taxation. Mason contends that the OECD’s first BEPS project “transformed” international 
taxation by making the OECD into such an institution. This contention remains controversial. See Yariv Brauner, 
Serenity Now! The (Not So) Inclusive Framework and the Multilateral Instrument, SSRN (Jul. 1, 2021); Shu-yi Oei, 
World Tax Policy in the World Tax Polity? An Event History Analysis of OECD/G20 BEPS Inclusive Framework 
Membership, 47 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021-2022). Cui, supra note 59.  
119 Letter from Steve Mnuchin, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, to Finance Ministers of France, Italy, Spain, and the 
U.K. (Jun. 12, 2020).  
120 See text accompanying supra notes 48-50  for the OECD’s position against ringfencing—a position heavily 
influenced by the U.S.’ position.  
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agreement (France and some of its EU allies) was the threat of DSTs, which are not constrained by tax 
treaties. This “inducement” was not sufficient for the U.S., given that the Trump Administration believed 
that the U.S. could deter DSTs simply with Section 301 retaliatory tariffs. But in the version of Pillar One 
that the OECD announced in July 2021, the scope of new taxing rights based on sales was narrowed to 
fewer than 100 MNCs.121 This allowed Secretary Yellen to inform the U.S. Congress that Pillar One would 
not result in losses of U.S. revenue to foreign governments.122 A multilateral tax agreement would then 
become attractive to the U.S., as long as it still leads to a ban on DST adoption.123    
 
 If this is how global tax agreement comes together, it would of course be quite ironic: even if the 
OECD proposal was to enable some countries with weak bilateral bargaining power to obtain some more 
favorable terms through multilateral agreements, it would also enable one country with strong 
bargaining power (the U.S.) to deprive all participating countries of a tax instrument that they already 
had in their possession—a result that would have been difficult for the U.S. to obtain acting alone. In 
fact, the smaller the scope of application of the newly-created taxing rights, the clearer it is that the 
main outcome of Pillar One is the prohibition of DSTs. On net, the countries with purportedly weak 
bargaining power may lose from the multilateral agreement.124 This detracts from the rationalization of 
a multilateral tax agreement as enabling countries with weak bargaining. 
 
 An additional irony highlights the second set of questions about Pillar One. DSTs have been 
spontaneously adopted or proposed, in developed and developing countries alike, to tax MNCs. Both 
symbolically and in substance, they represent the opposite of a global “race to the bottom” of lowering 
tax rates for MNCs. Yet Pillar One, the linchpin of a global agreement purportedly aimed at ending tax 
competition, is premised on putting an end to this “race to the top.” In what sense, then, does Pillar One 
contribute to limiting tax competition and MNC tax avoidance?  
 
One technical argument, which has not been espoused by the OECD or the G7 countries, is that 
the method of profit allocation proposed under Pillar One offers a limited implementation of what is 
called “sales-based formulary apportionment.”125 Some scholars have argued that sales-based formulary 
apportionment reduces profit-shifting, because the location of a firm’s customers is less subject to 
discretion and manipulation than the location of holding companies or even of plants and other 
productive activities. If this relatively fixed factor determines which countries get to tax MNC profits, 
then many profit-shifting techniques may become ineffective, and countries may engage in less tax 
competition to attract productive investment.126 This argument has been debated in recent years, with 
other scholars countering that sales-based formulary apportionment simply creates new distortions and 
new opportunities for tax avoidance.127 Moreover, advocates for sales-based formulary apportionment 
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122 Cite.  
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126 See, id.; DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 36. 
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suggest that it is a unilaterally attractive policy to adopt: its adoption should not depend on 
international cooperation.128 If the Pillar One proposal claimed credentials as a policy of limiting tax 
competition and tax avoidance on the basis of this argument, it would have involved both a substantial 
modification of the argument and something of a leap of faith.    
   
 In reality, many commentators—and the OECD itself—do not regard Pillar One as serving these 
purposes. Instead, a more common narrative is that MNC profit-shifting has largely been dealt with by 
the earlier OECD BEPS project, and residual profit-shifting issues (and tax competition) are subjects for 
Pillar Two. Pillar One solves a distinct distributional issue: countries are unhappy about the allocation of 
taxing rights under the international tax status quo, and they seek to renegotiate their allocation under 
a new international tax agreement.129 Conveniently, this teleological narrative invokes the OECD’s 
earlier BEPS project to lend credibility to the OECD’s role for brokering unprecedented international 
negotiations, while trying to explain away why major international conflict in the tax area seems to have 
erupted after a recent international agreement. 
 
 This narrative, however, is so deeply in tension with the idea that nations need to cooperate to 
end tax competition and MNC avoidance that it almost undermines the latter. The narrative portrays the 
global profits of MNCs as a pie to be divided up among nations: the alleged problem with the status quo 
is that some countries are getting too little a piece of the pie while others are getting too much. The idea 
of tax competition, however, depicts countries as refraining from taxing what is in their right and ability 
to tax. More fundamentally, describing countries around the world as renegotiating to divide up a global 
pie depicts a community of nations already engaged in cooperation. Otherwise, they would not be 
discussing distributional issues: after all, dividing up a given pie is in itself a zero-sum game. But if 
countries are already cooperating so much that they are willing to negotiate different ways of sharing 
tax bases, how does the problem of tax competition even arise? 
 
Some media reports portray the difficulty of reaching ultimate agreement regarding the OECD’s 
Two Pillar solution as arising from the likelihood of bargaining failure, when countries negotiate the 
allocation of taxing rights under Pillar One. This understanding is inconsistent with the design of Pillar 
Two and the G7’s global minimum tax proposal: Pillar Two contemplates a global system of rules 
ensuring that large MNCs’ profits are taxed at least at the minimum tax rate, but treats, as merely a 
matter of convention, where such tax should be collected: in the residence country of the ultimate 
parent entity, the source country where the activities generating the income take place, some other 
country where the profit might be booked, or any combination of these. All that the minimum tax rules 
instruct is for countries to impose taxes that are conditional on other countries’ taxation. This suggests 
that who collects revenue is a matter of indifference to countries cooperating to implement the system. 
Yet how can countries be so keen to claim additional taxing rights (or be so sensitive to ceding tax rights 
to others) under Pillar One, but at the same time be willing to merely follow a set of allocation 
conventions under Pillar Two, regardless of their distributional consequences?   
 
 In summary, it is quite plausible to see the OECD Pillar One proposal as securing a win for the 
U.S. and MNCs that are potentially targeted by DSTs, rather than for countries aiming either to claim 
greater taxing rights or to increase taxes on MNCs. It is far less plausible to claim that Pillar One 
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introduces policies that reduce tax competition and substantially change MNCs’ tax avoidance 
opportunities. In these respects, Pillar One resembles Pillar Two.  
 
3. Is ending tax (and subsidy) competition good for the world? 
 
I have argued so far that the OECD’s Two Pillar proposal, as endorsed by the G20 and the IF in 
July 2021, does not actually support international cooperation to end corporate tax competition and 
MNC tax avoidance. This conclusion contradicts claims made by political leaders and the global media 
about what expected international agreements will accomplish. It is, however, consistent with a 
substantial body of scholarship on the nature of international tax competition and cooperation. 
 
 The standard idea of international corporate tax competition envisions countries setting their 
corporate tax rates in reaction to other countries—and lowering tax rates when others do so—to avoid 
an outflow of investment. While it is tempting to use this idea to explain the decline of CIT rates around 
the world in the last four decades, both theoretically and empirically, there is substantial doubt about 
whether corporate tax competition of this kind even exists.130 But even assuming that corporate tax 
competition may be an important phenomenon, scholars are able to offer little support for the idea that 
countries can derive mutual gain from cooperating to end tax competition. Economists have extensively 
modelled the potential welfare gains from such cooperation.131 Their general conclusion is that 
cooperation to raise CIT rates is beneficial to all parties only under patently counter-factual 
circumstances. In particular, at least three conditions must simultaneously hold.132 First, there is no 
(effective) residence-country taxation: this assumption is necessary, because no country can attract 
foreign investment by lowering tax rates if the ultimate tax burdens of the foreign investors are 
determined solely by their residence countries. Second, the countries have no other, more efficient tax 
instruments at their disposal to raise revenue. Those that do would have no reason to levy the CIT in the 
first place.133 Third, countries are symmetrical in size. When they are asymmetrical, there will be winners 
and losers from uniformly raising tax rates: for example, small countries may lose more by way of the 
ability to attract capital than big countries. If the losers are not compensated, they experience no gain 
from cooperation. When many countries are included in some proposed international agreement, all 
three of these conditions are likely to be simultaneously violated.  
 
Viewed from this perspective, it is unsurprising that countries have previously not entered into 
any agreement to end tax competition. And if certain countries agree to end tax competition despite 
their own preferences—as some are said to have done134—to say that they have “cooperated” is no 
different from saying that they have been coerced. Even if an agreement enhances global welfare, can it 
be said to represent “international cooperation” if countries are coerced into the agreement (to their 
own detriment)? 
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In reality, this is not even the relevant question: it is not clear why maintaining a minimum CIT 
rate across all countries is good for the world. There is nothing intrinsically good about the CIT in itself, 
and least of all in the form that countries have traditionally relied on (i.e. on the basis of corporate 
residence and legal conventions about the sources of income). Plenty of scholars have advocated for the 
abolition of the CIT (in its traditional form) in the last decade.135 Even for countries that are interested in 
strong redistributive tax policies to secure high levels of economic equality, the CIT is non-essential: 
shareholder-level taxation, for example, could be just as effective an approach to redistribution.136 It 
follows that having no CIT or only a low-rate CIT does not in itself make any country morally deficient. 
Moreover, tax competition is not the main reason—often, it is not even a relevant reason—why some 
countries have no CIT or only a low-rate CIT.137 Unless one takes the CIT as immutable, the relevant 
question should be the following: why is a global minimum tax good for the world?  
 
Implicit in recent discussions of the OECD’s Pillar Two proposal is a different type of tax 
competition. Recall the anti-avoidance rules described in Part I.C.1 that allow the country containing 
corporate headquarters (HQs) to subject the low-taxed income of foreign subsidiaries to additional tax 
in the HQ country (e.g. IIR, GILTI, and other CFC-like rules). Historically, countries have introduced such 
rules on a unilateral basis.138 However, it has been recently suggested that countries that host corporate 
HQs—especially major advanced economies such as the U.S., UK, and Germany—may face pressure to 
relax their anti-avoidance rules, because MNCs could relocate their HQs to countries with less stringent 
anti-avoidance rules.139 In the absence of cooperation, such countries face “headquarter competition” 
that resemble a classic prisoner’s dilemma: anti-avoidance rules are relaxed in all countries (and tax 
revenue is lost), but no country attracts more HQs than they would have with collectively stronger anti-
avoidance rules. In this scenario, it is not in the unilateral interests of the HQ countries to adopt 
strengthened worldwide taxation, even though it is in their collective interest to adopt this policy. It 
makes sense for countries to rigorously tax MNCs’ worldwide income only if other countries also do so. 
If this were true, then a case for international cooperation could emerge. 
 
 This hypothesis about the existence of “headquarter competition” is questionable both 
theoretically and empirically. The basic theoretical question is why it might not be in the unilateral 
interests of countries to enact rigorous worldwide taxation systems.140 To put it differently, why might it 
be in the unilateral interests of countries to aid and abet “their own” multinationals in deferral, profit- 
shifting, and the generation of stateless income?141 In the U.S., for example, there have been plenty of 
arguments that the U.S. worldwide taxation system puts U.S. companies at a disadvantage in their 
                                                          
135 Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues with a Mark-to-Market Tax on Shareholder 
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139 For a recent expression of this reasoning, see Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, A historic global minimum tax 
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tax administration, rather than incentives. See Gordon & Hines, supra note 96, at 1945-1948; Auerbach, Devereux 
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overseas activities.142 However, those who make such arguments do not make the claim that 
abandoning worldwide taxation necessarily makes the U.S. (or any other country) better off overall. 
Empirically, the claim that countries engage in “headquarter competition” has gained little evidence. 
Even evidence that MNCs’ HQ relocation decisions are responsive to anti-avoidance rules is very 
preliminary.143 No study has been done to determine whether countries vary their anti-avoidance rules 
to attract HQs.  
 
 But even if we assume that countries hosting HQs of major MNCs do compete for them by 
refraining from rigorous residence-based taxation, it does not follow that the world is better off if these 
countries end such competition. To see why, an analogy between lax residence country taxation and 
export subsidies is useful. If a country taxes its residence corporations’ domestic and foreign income 
equally, then it may help to secure neutrality of corporate investment decisions.144 If, instead, it taxes 
domestic income but allows foreign income to be subject to a lower tax rate, the foregone tax revenue 
represents a form of subsidy for foreign investment. Suppose that one country’s policy to subsidize its 
multinationals’ foreign investment invites other countries to enact similar subsidies, because the latter 
fear the loss of competitiveness of their MNCs. This may engender a form of “subsidy competition” for 
outbound investment, of which HQ competition is only an instance.145 However, subsidies from either 
one country or a set of countries for foreign investment may well benefit other countries’ hosting 
investment. It is thus far from clear that the removal of such subsidies would make all countries better 
off.146 
 
In reality, neither the G7, nor the OECD, nor any existing scholarly analysis has claimed either 
that subsidy competition among capital exporting countries is significant or that such competition 
endangers global welfare. While trade tensions may erupt among the few countries that engage in such 
competition—as for example between the U.S. and the EU in the large aircraft manufacturing case147—
the idea of such competition hardly offers a case for global cooperation.   
II. Some Older Puzzles in International Taxation  
 
The dearth of substantive justifications for recently proposed international tax agreements 
stands in stark contrast with widespread claims about the enormous promises of such agreements. Yet 
in some ways, this kind of situation—of gaping gaps between theory and practice—is a regular feature in 
the landscape of international taxation. Economic theory has long struggled to rationalize basic 
institutions in international income taxation, and in this Part, I highlight several longstanding puzzles 
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that bear on current discussions of international tax cooperation.148 I first offer three examples of basic 
institutions in international income taxation that economic theory has failed to rationalize, and explain 
how, in each case, the deficiencies in understanding continue to sow confusion in debates about the 
scope and benefits of international tax cooperation. I then discuss what major assumptions economists 
have made that may have contributed to this theoretical failure.   
 
A. The puzzle of source country taxation  
 
As discussed earlier, a major rationale offered for the G7 and OECD’s global minimum tax 
proposal is ending tax competition—the race among countries to lower their corporate tax rates in 
order to attract foreign investment. Tax competition, however, connotes the idea that countries lower 
their tax rates in reaction to other countries doing so.149 If, regardless of what other countries do, a 
country already has incentives to lower its tax on foreign investments, then tax competition may not be 
the right explanation of observed reductions in tax rates. Further, if the world as a whole is better off if 
no country taxed the investment returns of foreigners, then cooperation to maintain such taxes would 
clearly be misguided.  
 
Economic theory, however, points precisely to these conclusions. The first important theoretical 
argument, traceable to the founding works of optimal tax theory, is that countries that are small open 
economies seeking to attract investment from a global capital market (and in particular, from foreigners 
who can easily invest elsewhere), should not try to tax the investment returns of foreigners at all: they 
should tax their own residents instead.150 The reasoning for this conclusion is elegant and well-known.  
For any small open economy (Country X), any tax it imposes on foreign investors will not affect the rate 
of return faced by the latter. This is because foreign investors who are contemplating investments in 
Country X will require an after-tax rate of return determined by the interest rate that prevails on the 
world capital market. Given that Country X is small relative to the global economy, any tax increase it 
introduces on foreign investment will not affect this world price of capital; it simply implies that the 
investment in Country X must yield a higher pre-tax return, to leave an after-tax return not below the 
world price.  
 
Because of this need for a higher pre-tax return, domestic investments that cannot achieve such 
returns would no longer be made. The reduction in investment will generally reduce the returns to local 
productive factors, such as workers’ wages and rent paid to landlords. Any tax collected on mobile 
capital, therefore, does not reduce the after-tax returns of foreign investors, but instead comes at the 
expense of—i.e. it is economically incident upon—local workers and other factor providers. In light of 
this consequence, Country X would be better off directly raising the tax on local immobile factors: it 
would collect the same revenue from the same local population, but more domestic investments would 
be made to benefit that population.  
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Given the assumptions made by economic theory,151 therefore, it is in the interest of each 
country that is a small open economy to refrain from taxing the return to mobile capital, regardless of 
what other countries do.152 If these assumptions hold, then countries acting in their own interest would 
not tax the capital income of foreigners in the first place—rendering the topic of tax competition moot. 
What about the conclusion that, from the perspective of the world’s welfare, it is also bad for countries 
to tax the return to mobile capital owned by foreigners? The argument for this is also simple. If capital is 
conceived of as an input to production, then, when different countries impose different tax rates, the 
costs of production will differ among them (even when everything else is equal). This distorts how firms 
located in different countries use capital as an input. In contrast, if only the countries where the owners 
of capital reside tax the returns to such capital, then these owners will demand the same return 
wherever the capital is deployed, and users of capital everywhere will face the same cost of capital. 
Removing the distortion in the use of capital allows the world as a whole to enjoy greater output as a 
result.153    
 
 In summary, by a basic line of reasoning, it is in neither the individual nor the collective interests 
of countries to tax the return to investment owned by foreigners. Taxing the capital income of 
foreigners is akin to imposing protectionist tariffs on imported intermediate goods, whereas taxing only 
the capital income of one’s own residents sustains free trade.154 Yet imposing taxes on domestic 
investments made by foreigners—known as “source-based” taxation—is a common and fundamental 
feature of income tax systems around the world.155   
 
To appreciate how this is a genuine puzzle, consider first some casual rationalizations of 
“source-based” taxation that have been offered to resolve it. For example, it might be suggested that 
countries tax investments made by foreigners just because they can, and because it might be politically 
expedient to tax foreigners as opposed to one’s own citizens.156 This clearly does not resolve the puzzle: 
if the economic incidence of the tax on mobile capital is on the local population, as the theory above 
predicts, domestic political constituents should not find it expedient to hurt themselves, or do so just 
because “they can.”  
 
Another possible rationalization is that when countries where investors reside—known as 
“residence countries”—tax their own investors’ worldwide income but reimburse them for foreign taxes 
paid (through rules for foreign tax credits), the investors would be indifferent to source country taxes.157 
Source countries would then no longer shy away from taxing foreigners. The problem with this answer is 
that, as we will see below, the fact that residence countries offer foreign tax credits presents a genuine 
puzzle in itself; one thus cannot use this to resolve the puzzle of source country taxation.  
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To reconcile the prevalence of source-country taxation and its sub-optimal character (even from 
nations’ purely self-interested perspectives), economists have gone so far as to postulate that residence-
based taxation is administratively so difficult that governments have no choice but to tax capital on a 
source basis, so that their own residents do not escape tax by disguising as foreigners.158 Yet this 
conjecture has never been supported by much evidence and has increasingly seemed an implausible 
description of reality: countries have made much gain in the last two decades in reducing bank secrecy 
and deterring tax evasion through offshore accounts.159  
 
Yet another explanation for source-country taxation is that some countries may be such large 
importers of capital that by taxing capital imports, they are able to depress the world price of capital, 
and thereby make their own capital users better off.160 To put it differently, a large capital-importing 
country may be able to pass at least a part of the cost of the tax imposed on mobile capital to 
foreigners. As we will see in Part III, this idea lies at the foundation of the most important theory of 
international trade agreements (the “terms of trade” theory). Yet strong empirical evidence for the idea 
has emerged only recently.161 In international income taxation, the idea has attracted little attention. At 
first blush, few countries seem to wield such monopsony power over world capital, while source-country 
taxation is by no means limited just to a few large capital importing countries. Moreover, if one 
considers a large country like the United States, which both imports and exports a lot of capital, its 
observed behavior is also inconsistent with what the idea predicts. On the one hand, the U.S. has 
increased its capital imports since the 1970s, but its tax rates on foreign investment have, for the most 
part, gone down rather than up.162 On the other hand, as a large capital exporter (on a gross if not net 
basis), the theory would predict that the U.S. would specifically tax capital exports—which would raise 
the world price of capital to the benefit of U.S. capital owners. But as we will also see shortly, the U.S. 
has subsidized capital export instead through its foreign tax credit system and through rules that defer 
the taxation of foreign income. 
 
There are in fact two additional explanations of source-based taxation that might make the 
latter less puzzling, yet neither received emphasis in prior scholarship nor were deemed decisive. First, it 
is possible for certain investments to generate “location-specific rent” (LSR)—above-normal returns that 
can only be earned by investments in a specific place. In such cases, the country where the investments 
are located can tax foreigners at high tax rates, because, by hypothesis, the foreigners cannot earn such 
above-normal returns elsewhere.163 However, economists seem to have resisted using LSR to explain 
source-based taxation in general.164 Instead, they have tended to assume that LSR arises only in 
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connection with a small set of industries, such as natural resource extraction.165 The basis of this 
assumption is often not explicitly discussed. One possible reason for it is that the wide prevalence of LSR 
would be incompatible with the supposition that the subject of international taxation is perfectly 
mobile, homogenous capital. If income taxation of foreigners mainly applied in cases where investments 
have sunk cost, are uniquely matched to specific markets, involve bilateral monopolies or other forms of 
imperfect markets, or are not about the taxation of capital at all (but instead apply to services), 
economists’ most familiar models of international taxation would cease to apply.166   
 
 Second, much of what is called “source taxation” in international taxation may just be a 
misnomer for corporate income taxation: taxation of the income accruing to corporations as legal 
persons. A corporation formed in Country X may be subject to CIT there, regardless of where it derives 
its income from and who its shareholders are. But because the CIT is imposed on the corporation 
regardless of shareholder identity, it in effect taxes foreigners (along with domestic shareholders). It is 
thus often difficult to distinguish between taxation by source and taxation by corporate residence. The 
prevalence of “source-based taxation” may in part simply reflect the prevalence of the CIT. In this case, 
the puzzle of source-based taxation is traceable partly to the question of why countries should tax 
corporations instead of just their shareholders.167 Economic theory, however, has had little to say about 
why the CIT is used as a tax instrument in the first place. In theoretical analyses of international taxation, 
the existence of CIT is simply taken for granted.  
 
 These last two explanations, therefore, would rationalize the prevalence of “source-based 
taxation” only at the expense of overthrowing not only much of economic theory but also presumptions 
in practical discourses about international tax that have prevailed for more than half a century. Unless 
they are better understood—we return to them in Part IV—the puzzle of “source-based taxation” 
remains.      
 
B. The puzzle of unilateral relief from double taxation  
 
 A second longstanding theoretical puzzle concerns another basic arrangement in international 
income taxation: countries from which investment capital originates—the “residence countries”—tend 
to unilaterally lower taxes on their residents’ foreign income to reduce the risk of such income being 
“double taxed” in both the residence and source countries. Such tax reduction can take the form of 
offering credits for foreign income tax paid against domestic tax liability, or (usually for more limited 
categories of income such as business income and dividends) by exempting the foreign income of 
taxpayers altogether. Scholars have long observed that such policies would not make sense if residence 
countries were motivated by their own national interests.168 Under the FTC system, for example, the 
residence country in effect helps its own taxpayers ignore the costs of foreign taxes when considering 
investment abroad, by providing a reimbursement against such costs. If each country thinks of its 
national welfare as the sum of its own residents’ incomes and the tax revenue it collects, however, taxes 
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paid to foreign governments represent a genuine cost, and governments should not want their 
taxpayers to be indifferent to such costs.  
 
Policies of reimbursing taxpayers for foreign taxes thus seem to irrationally (from a unilateral 
perspective) transfer wealth to foreign governments. The appropriate treatment of foreign taxes paid, 
from a unilateral, self-interested perspective, is to allow them to be deducted in the calculation of a 
resident taxpayer’s income, just like other business costs. This is how most countries operating FTC 
systems treat foreign, non-income taxes paid. However, income taxes are eligible for unilateral FTCs.169   
 
 Historically, the fact that residence but not source countries are expected to provide relief from 
double taxation is often justified by a normative claim that source countries deserve primary taxing 
rights because foreign investments benefit from the public goods and services source countries 
provide.170 The argument for such a normative claim, however, often comes to no more than that 
people have made it in the past. The oddity of the claim can be seen in light of the economic argument 
against source country taxation described above: that argument applies precisely when residence 
countries cede the primacy of their taxing rights. When countries exempt their residents’ foreign income 
from taxation, source country taxes determine the tax burden of this income. In such situations, it is 
both in their unilateral interests and in the interest of the world for source countries not to tax foreign 
capital.171 When residence taxation is efficient, but source taxation is inefficient, the normative case for 
the primacy of a source country’s taxing right is not at all obvious.   
 
 Another prominent justification for FTC systems offered in the past is that it promotes 
worldwide welfare by securing “capital export neutrality” (CEN). If a capital-exporting county (Country Y) 
has a higher tax rate than capital-importing countries, then Country Y’s implementation of the FTC 
system means that its investors will face the same tax rate—that of Country Y—wherever they invest. 172 
In the face of distortionary source country taxes, this restores the efficient allocation of capital—which 
purely residence-based taxation would have achieved. Economically, the effect of FTCs can be explained 
by analogy to tariffs and subsidies on the trade in goods. If an importing country imposes a tariff on 
imports, that tariff can be neutralized—and free trade restored—by an equal subsidy by the exporting 
country.173 Similarly, a distortionary source-based tax can be neutralized by the residence country’s use 
of FTCs. However, this amounts to a very awkward explanation of FTC’s adoption. Essentially, one must 
assume that source countries irrationally tax foreigners, self-inflicting the wound of import tariffs 
against both the individual and collective interests of nations, and that residence countries then act 
against self-interest to cure this wound.174  
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 The puzzle of residence country measures of unilateral relief from double taxation raises a basic 
challenge for understanding international tax cooperation, for at least two reasons. First, it creates 
ambiguity for scholarly analyses as to whether countries should be assumed to act in their own self-
interest, or whether countries may also act altruistically to enhance world welfare (in the face of 
irrational actions of other countries.) If countries act altruistically in adopting the FTC, what are the 
boundaries of this altruism—should countries be assumed to act altruistically in other contexts as well?  
 
 Second, the puzzle also introduces uncertainty regarding whether residence and source 
countries act strategically with respect to each other. In an FTC system, if source country income taxes 
are reimbursed, would source countries have incentives to raise or expand their income taxes (while 
reducing other taxes)?175 And if they do, would the residence countries simply remain indifferent to such 
strategic action? In an exemption system, if source countries, acting unilaterally or in competition with 
one another, reduce their tax rates, would the residence country recognize that the purported primacy 
of source country taxing rights is foregone, and therefore assert its own taxing right more? International 
tax scholarship has generally identified no clear and persistent instances of such strategic interactions, 
which has suggested to some that countries do not behave strategically in the international tax 
sphere.176  
 
 These ambiguities have permeated recent discussions of international tax agreements. The 
OECD’s Pillar Two proposal, in both its IIR and the UTPR aspects, in effect advocates the FTC system over 
the exemption system. The impetus for introducing an IIR is that exemption systems that applied even 
when foreign income was subject to low taxation allow MNCs to get away with “stateless income” or 
“double non-taxation.” Under the IIR, residence countries may still adopt either the FTC or the 
exemption system when the foreign income of resident taxpayers has been subject to a minimum tax 
rate (of 15%), but below that minimum rate, an FTC system is to be adopted. This suggests that the aim 
of the OECD’s proposal is not to enhance efficiency in global capital allocation through collective action 
(if the residence country tax rate is above the minimum rate, the exemption system does not secure 
CEN). Instead, an explicitly alleged aim of the IIR is to incentivize countries with low taxes to raise their 
tax rates.177 But this aim relies on an assumption that source countries do act strategically in respect of 
residence countries’ tax rules. This assumption not only lacks clear evidence, but also further clouds our 
understanding of the motives of the residence countries’ decisions.  
 
The UTPR further confounds our understanding of the basis of unilateral relief from double 
taxation. The UTPR can be seen as a reverse FTC: a source country from which a payment is made would 
raise its tax if the residence country does not sufficiently tax the payment but would lower its tax if the 
residence country raises its tax on the payment. The source country now reimburses the residence 
country’s taxes. Normatively, this suggests the notion of a primacy to residence country taxing rights—
which is incompatible with traditional rationales for residence country unilateral relief. Further, it 
suggests that residence countries will respond to source country tax rates, raising their own rates when 
source country tax rates are raised. It is unclear why residence countries would do so while at the same 
time maintaining FTC systems (or exemption systems above the minimum rate).   
 
                                                          
175 Gordon, supra note 157, at 1175; see also Eric Bond, Optimal tax and tariff policies with tax credits, 30 J. INT’L 
ECON. 317 (1991). 
176 Whalley, supra note 168, at 14.  
177 See text accompanying note 110 supra.  
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C. The puzzle(s) of bilateral tax treaties  
 
A third longstanding puzzle for scholars of international taxation arises from bilateral income tax 
treaties. The puzzle is multifaceted, and some of its aspects are better-known than others. Perhaps the 
best-known aspect of the treaty puzzle arises from the co-existence of unilateral reliefs from double 
taxation and treaties.178 Since many countries already unilaterally adopt the exemption or foreign tax 
credit system—thereby ceding primary taxing rights to source countries—little explicit cooperation 
between countries through tax treaties seems to be needed to prevent double taxation. This does not 
mean that treaties are completely useless in removing double taxation. For example, they offer mutual 
agreement procedures for tax authorities from the contracting states to agree on profit allocations in 
transfer pricing cases, where such agreement is necessary to prevent double taxation.179 However, most 
of the provisions of income tax treaties play no role in reducing double taxation beyond unilateral 
reliefs. Importantly, treaties usually require elimination of double taxation only according to the 
provisions of domestic law, thus giving eminent primacy to domestic rather than treaty law.180 A major 
purported goal of income tax treaties, that of preventing double taxation, therefore seems redundant. 
 
Further, income tax treaties tend to reduce the taxing right of source countries by limiting the 
latter’s taxation of business profits, dividends, interests, royalties, capital gains, income from shipping, 
and other types of income earned by residents of the other contracting state. The situation of taxpayers, 
however, would remain unaffected if they still need to pay tax on such income in the residence country. 
If the residence countries already offer relief from double taxation, treaty-based reductions of source 
country taxes simply lower the burden of reimbursement for the residence countries and in effect 
transfer revenue to the latter.181  Scholars have found the implicit revenue transfers in tax treaties 
paradoxical. When two countries engage in roughly symmetrical trade, such transfers roughly cancel 
out, making the negotiated tax reductions pointless. When two countries engage in asymmetrical trade, 
revenue is transferred to the country the residents of which receive more of the types of income 
affected by treaties—typically the richer country. This has struck many scholars as morally perverse.182 
 
However, underlying this aspect of the treaty puzzle is the puzzling nature of the policy of 
unilateral relief from double taxation offered by residence countries. If it weren’t for this latter puzzling 
phenomenon, tax treaties would not easily be regarded as redundant.183 There is in fact a different way 
of seeing the puzzle presented by income tax treaties, without taking unilateral relief by residence 
countries as a given. The fact that treaties reduce source country tax rates suggest that without 
                                                          
178 Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 939 (2000). 
179 Bruce A. Blonigen, Lindsay Oldenski & Nicholas Sly, The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties, 6:2 AM. 
ECON. J.: ECON. POL. 1 (2014). 
180 See, Frank Pötgens & Georg Kofler, Article 23 “Relief” (Methods for Elimination of Double Taxation), in IBFD 
GLOBAL TAX TREATY COMMENTARIES (Pasquale Pistone & Betty Andrade eds., 2014).  
181 One early and prominent economic explanation of tax treaties assumed that relief of double taxation using the 
FTC method was available only through income tax treaties. In this explanation, the source country (borrowing 
capital) would lower its tax rate to induce the residence country (lending capital) to offer the FTC, whereas the 
latter would not have offered FTC otherwise. This results in mutual benefits. Koichi Hamada, Strategic Aspects of 
Taxation on Foreign Investment Income, 80:3 Q. J. ECON. 361 (1966). However, countries do not generally offer FTCs 
only to countries with which they have entered into tax treaties. 
182 Dagan, supra note 178, at __.  
183 See, Hamada, supra note 181; Gordon, supra note 157. Just as we would not want to explain away the puzzle of 
source-based taxation by assuming the puzzling arrangement of unilateral relief by residence countries, we should 
not want to assume this latter arrangement in postulating another puzzle.  
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cooperation, source country taxation is too high. If countries gain from cooperation to reduce source 
country taxes, then treaties can be useful even without purporting to serve the function of removing 
double taxation.184 In other words, the gain from reciprocal reductions of source country taxes, rather 
than the prevention of double taxation, might be the main reason for entering into tax treaties. 
However, the idea that source countries unilaterally would set taxes too high stands in contrast with the 
prediction that they would set taxes low—either due to tax competition, or due to considerations of the 
inefficiency (and irrationality) of taxing mobile capital. The treaty puzzle can then be seen as a form of 
the puzzle of source country taxation: we cannot explain what treaties are for unless we can explain why 
source countries tax so much.185  
 
These two aspects of the tax treaty puzzle correspond to what are believed to be two of the 
main purposes of tax treaties: the relief of double taxation and the reduction of source-country tax 
rates. Tax treaties contain other major features, many of which raise puzzles of their own.  For example, 
why do source countries reduce only their withholding tax rates in treaties, but not their corporate tax 
rates? As another example, although tax treaties contain some non-discrimination provisions, they are 
generally quite weak, and crucially, permit the most basic form of discrimination, between residents and 
non-residents.186 In contrast, as Part III will discuss, trade agreements tend to contain many other key 
provisions besides tariff reductions, most importantly, those that prohibit non-tariff barriers to market 
access and discrimination. In reality, there has been generally little attempt to explain the features of 
income tax treaties in economic or social scientific terms Perhaps the puzzles of source country taxes 
and of residence country unilateral reliefs from double taxation are already so daunting that there is 
little solid theoretical ground for tackling the explanation of this form of apparent international 
cooperation, despite its utter familiarity.  
 
D. Predicaments for economic analysis  
 
 The three older puzzles of international taxation described in this Part generate three serious 
predicaments for the economic analysis of the subject.  
 
First, because of the puzzles of source-country taxation and residence country unilateral reliefs 
from double taxation, economists have, to a large extent, given up the assumption that countries act 
rationally and purely in their own national interests in the international tax arena. If countries did so act, 
small open economies would not impose taxes on the income accruing to foreign owners of mobile 
capital, and residence countries would not provide foreign tax credits to their residents (or exempt such 
income altogether). But since these are key features of international income taxation, depicting 
countries as acting rationally in pursuit of some coherent conception of national self-interest becomes 
difficult.187 As a result, scholars in international taxation—even economists—often fail to consider what 
                                                          
184 Gordon & Hines, supra note 96, at 1950. 
185 Some proposed (and unsatisfactory) solutions for the source country taxation puzzle also stumble at explaining 
tax treaties. For example, source country taxes may be explicable in the case of large capital-importing countries, 
which may pass some of the cost of such taxes onto capital owners elsewhere. However, this theory does not 
explain why there are so many bilateral tax treaties in the world, including ones signed by small countries that are 
clearly price takers in the global capital market. 
186 Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 (2000-2001). 
187 In traditional explanations of why countries impose tariffs when that seems to reduce their national welfare 
(defined as national income), it has been suggested that governments may be seized by domestic special interest 
groups to adopt protectionist policies. Such policies may benefit some politically organized group (e.g. import-
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it is in countries’ unilateral self-interest to do.188 Proposals for reforming international taxation usually 
do not separately consider the implications of unilateral and multilateral adoptions of the proposals.189 
 
 Second and even more importantly, scholars of international taxation have had to abandon an 
intuitive, and widely applied, template for explaining human cooperation–whether among individuals, 
tribes and communities, large organizations, or nations. In this template, one must first identify the 
need for cooperation. To do so, one usually must examine what the potential participants in 
cooperation would do in its absence. This is often analyzed in terms of what course of action each 
participant would choose when pursuing its own interest, taking what others do as given—a way of 
making decisions that economists call “Nash-optimization.” One then considers whether there are 
courses of action for the participants to take so that everyone is better off than in the scenario in which 
each participant Nash-optimizes. If there are, then the Nash-optimal courses of action can be criticized 
as “inefficient” or “socially non-optimal,” since everyone can be better off following the alternative 
courses of action. The need for cooperation is thereby identified: by cooperating, participants can follow 
the alternative courses of action to reach the socially optimal or the “efficiency frontier.” After 
identifying the need for cooperation in this way, one would then, as a next step, explain how the 
participants are or can be incentivized to act cooperatively instead of Nash-optimizing.  
 
 But when countries do not seem to Nash-optimize even in circumstances where they are 
unlikely to be cooperating, this basic template for explaining (actual) and justifying (actual or potential) 
cooperation ceases to be applicable. For example, the decision of how much (or little) to tax foreign 
owners of mobile capital under the CIT is generally regarded as a decision that each country can (and 
generally does) make by itself, without coordinating with others. Indeed, this is very often assumed in 
the tax competition literature. However, if countries are found not to Nash-optimize in this non-
cooperative context—e.g. if it is against their self-interest to tax foreigners, but they nonetheless do 
so—then one cannot justify cooperation either to lower taxes or to raise taxes. Cooperation is not 
needed to lower taxes on foreigners because that’s what countries should do already while not 
cooperating. Cooperation is not needed to raise taxes on foreigners because that’s what countries 
actually do already while not cooperating, and because it is not clear why countries are better off 
engaging in such cooperation.  
 
This is remarkable: in many areas of social science, it is the second step of explaining 
cooperation—identifying how agents can be motivated to act to secure the socially optimal and not the 
Nash-optimal—that is challenging, whereas the need for cooperation is easy to identify. Yet strangely, in 
the field of international corporate taxation, what has challenged both theorists and policymakers is the 
first step, identifying the need for cooperation. 
                                                          
competing industries) at the expense of other domestic constituents (e.g. consumers) that are less politically 
organized and of overall loss of national welfare. However, no such story is plausible for taxing mobile capital, as 
business groups are not often seen to lobby for the corporate income tax.   
188 This is striking, because the dominant approach in economics to explaining behavior is to assume agents are 
rational maximizers of self-interest (suitably defined): abandoning such an assumption in a particular area implies 
giving up the generality of the social scientific explanations one can ultimately produce. 
189 Consider a new tax design that has received much attention in recent years—the destination-based cash flow 
tax (DBCFT). Proponents of DBCFT give great emphasis to the fact the tax is “incentive compatible,” which means 
that countries have sufficient reasons to adopt it acting on their own, regardless of what other countries do. 
DEVEREUX ET AL., supra note 36, at __. This is the same as saying that Nash-optimizing countries would adopt the 
DBCFT. If other tax reform proposals also considered whether Nash-optimizing countries would adopt them, the 




 This second predicament leads to the third: the difficulty in identifying the need for cooperation 
has undermined theoretical interest in specifying the “social optimal” in the international tax area. The 
“social optimal,” when the relevant set of agents comprises countries, is usually thought of as the 
arrangements that maximize the aggregate welfare of countries. For example, as discussed earlier, if the 
main impact of international income tax regimes is on mobile capital, and if capital is conceived of as a 
homogeneous intermediate good, then under traditional optimal tax theory, any optimal tax system 
must be characterized by production efficiency, which source country taxation violates (if different 
countries adopt different tax rates). Therefore, source-based taxation is not socially optimal from a 
global perspective, in this traditional view. In general, it is unlikely that what countries do, without 
coordination, will produce exactly the social optimal: a “social planner” would always be able to dictate 
a different configuration of national policies that improve upon the actual configuration. At the same 
time, since there is no single global social planner dictating countries’ tax policies, not all configurations 
that are superior from an efficiency perspective are relevant. Only the improvements that countries can 
cooperate to achieve are of interest. But if it is not possible to explain or justify cooperation in the 
international tax context, characterizing the social optimal becomes less disciplined.190  
 
 The severity of the predicaments may in fact explain why the puzzles identified in this Part are 
not more widely discussed among economists and other tax scholars (even those whose work is much 
informed by economic scholarship). This is because they lead to a general state where both economic 
and legal scholars take much of international taxation as simply given, while making minimal efforts to 
rationalize them. Puzzles disappear when one is no longer even trying to make sense of things. This state 
of affairs is not only intellectually unsatisfying; it is especially dangerous during periods of rapid policy 
change. Incoherent and misleading rationales offered for proposed international agreements go 
challenged; the narratives that emerge from political announcements and press reports become even 
more devoid of the self-understanding that social science is supposed to provide. If the arguments in 
Part I about the untenability of the justifications for proposed international tax agreements are right, 
the louder are the claims of political success, the deeper is the underlying intellectual crisis facing the 
study of international taxation.   
 
III. A Tale of International Cooperation from Trade Agreements  
 
In contrast to the economic analysis of international taxation, there is a significant economic 
literature studying the normative rationale underlying the major international institutions governing 
international trade, especially the WTO.191 Rather than summarizing that literature, this Part highlights 
certain features of the literature’s most prominent theory: the “terms of trade” theory of trade 
agreements (abbreviated as “TTT” in this discussion). The aim is to show how TTT illustrates a 
                                                          
190 Scholars have observed in recent years that the economic analysis of international taxation no longer adopts 
the standard welfarist approach that incorporates efficiency and distributional concerns into a single normative 
framework. Instead, the use of ad hoc normative criteria is widespread. The basic paradigm of welfare analysis—
which compares the outcomes of Nash-optimizing and cooperative behavior in terms of individual and global 
welfare—has little traction in the analysis of international tax. See, David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in 
International Tax Policy, 68:3 NAT. TAX J. 635 (2015); Cui, supra note 127.  
191 For helpful introductory literature reviews, see Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, Is the WTO 
Passé?, 54:4 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1125 (2016); Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82. For more comprehensive literature 
reviews, see the chapters in HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL POLICY (Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, eds., 2016).  
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compelling template for explaining international cooperation, how it has been applied both to 
rationalize and critique key aspects of the WTO, and how its explanatory strategy contrasts with the 
state of intellectual ambivalence and confusion about international tax cooperation revealed in Parts I-II.   
 
A. Cooperation to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulations  
 
 TTT explains trade agreements, especially the GATT and other agreement within the WTO 
regime, by first identifying the problem such agreements are supposed to solve.192 This can be done if it 
is clear what countries would do in the absence of an agreement, and what is undesirable (or 
“inefficient”) about the outcomes of this non-cooperative behavior. In particular, TTT assumes that 
countries Nash-optimize in the trade arena when not cooperating. By identifying the inefficiencies 
resulting from Nash-optimal strategies, the need for cooperation—in the form of trade agreements—
becomes clear.  
 
 What do nations do in the trade area when they Nash-optimize?193 TTT allows a wide range of 
preferences and behaviors on the part of national governments. For one, governments may aim to 
maximize national income. In this case, according to traditional economic theory, they generally should 
adopt unilateral free trade policies, which allow a country to benefit maximally from comparative 
advantage. But governments may also hold particular distributional objectives. Consequently, they may, 
for example, impose protectionist tariffs to benefit capital owners or workers in import-competing 
sectors.194 Regardless of what preferences national governments hold, TTT points to a particular form of 
Nash-optimal behavior that they will always have incentives to engage in. Some large economies like the 
United States represent major trade destinations for exporters from other countries. Other, much 
smaller economies may nonetheless be substantial importers of particular types of goods. By virtue of 
their importance to exporters from other countries, both types of countries wield monopsony power in 
the various world markets they occupy—the options of selling to buyers in other countries are limited. 
Because of this, when they impose tariffs on imports, they will be able to pass a part of the cost of the 
tariff onto exporters from other countries—thus transferring wealth from foreigners to themselves.195 It 
seems plausible that each national government—whether it aims to maximize only national income or 
whether it pursues other domestic policy objectives as well—would see its own welfare as enhanced by 
such wealth transfers. Therefore, governments will always be motivated to set tariff rates higher than 
would otherwise be set in the absence of the ability to extract surplus from foreigners. Yet such transfer, 
                                                          
192 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 225 (“All theories of trade agreements must identify a reason why 
negotiating governments can gain from the agreement. This involves identifying a problem that would arise absent 
an agreement, when governments make noncooperative trade-policy choices. The purpose of the agreement can 
then be viewed as providing a solution to the problem, and the negotiating governments may share in the 
associated benefits.”). 
193 TTT pertains primarily to the trade in goods. The discussion of trade in this Part therefore implicitly refers only 
to the trade in goods.  
194 In other words, either free trade or protectionist policies can be unilaterally optimal for national governments, 
depending on their preferences.  
195 In particular, an import tariff depresses domestic demand, which (because of the country’s monopsony power) 
lowers the world price of the good subject to the tariff. This improves the country “terms of trade,” defined as the 
relative price of a country’s exports to its imports. Bagwell, Bown, & Staiger supra note 191, at 1142-1144. Changes 
in “terms of trade” are characterized in a general equilibrium context, whereas in a partial equilibrium context, the 
equivalent idea to the improved terms of trade is just that the cost of a tariff is partially passed onto foreign 
exporters. Id. at 1148-1149.       
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of course, comes at the expense of foreign exporters. The higher import tariff imposed by a country 
exploiting its monopsony power therefore creates a negative pecuniary externality for other countries.     
 
 However, when many countries (i.e. countries that are large importers relative to specific traded 
goods) try to transfer wealth from one another this way, they gain much less overall. A nation’s terms of 
trade may improve as a result of its tariffs but will worsen as a result of the tariffs of others. At the same 
time, high tariffs all around decrease trade and result in welfare losses to all. Countries engaged in 
terms-of-trade manipulations using their monopsony powers therefore are in a prisoner’s dilemma: 
manipulation is individually rational to pursue, but all will be better off refraining from it. TTT posits that 
the main function served by multilateral trade agreements—going back to the GATT and under the 
current WTO system—is to curtail such beggar-thy-neighbor policies.196  
 
TTT’s basic logic is thus attractively simple. Yet its rationalization of the GATT/WTO as a case of 
international cooperation that genuinely enhances global welfare is at once radical and important from 
a policy perspective. TTT is radical because it does not conceive of trade agreements as promoting free 
trade.197 Even after countries act cooperatively to reduce tariffs motivated by terms-of-trade 
manipulations, they may still retain positive tariffs for protectionist reasons. Protectionist tariffs may 
hurt foreign exporters and even domestic constituencies and may reduce overall global welfare. But 
according to TTT, it does not follow that there is opportunity for international cooperation to curtail 
protectionism. This is because protectionism may be individually optimal for a given country—it may 
maximize national welfare given governments’ distributional preferences. Curtailing protectionism 
therefore may not be in every nation’s self-interest, and trade agreements aimed at curtailing 
protectionism may simply make some countries better off and others worse off. By contrast, trade 
agreements that aim to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulations can make everyone better off (or at 
least make some countries better off without making others worse off). Countries can stay as 
protectionist (or pro-free-trade) as they like under the GATT/WTO; they would simply remove the 
mutually destructive terms-of-trade manipulations. The implication of TTT is that it is only this latter 
kind of agreement that represent international cooperation for mutual benefit.198     
 
While it thus contradicts naïve conceptions of the purpose of trade agreements, TTT provides a 
much-needed intellectual justification for the GATT/WTO—and this is the basic reason for its policy 
importance. If one does not seriously consider the possibility of terms-of-trade manipulations, trade 
agreements are actually hard to make sense of. Before TTT gained ascendance, many economists were 
skeptical that trade agreements served any rational purpose.199 This is because, on the one hand, 
governments trying to maximize national income should unilaterally embrace free trade if they are 
unable to manipulate terms of trade. They should therefore not condition their own free trade policy on 
                                                          
196 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 224.  
197 See Donald H. Regan, Explaining Trade Agreements. The Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model, 14:3 
WORLD TRADE REV. 391 (2015).  
198 Id. The GATT emerged in the aftermath of the World War Two (WWII) as addressing the outbreak of 
protectionism and retaliatory tariffs in the 1930s following the U.S.’ Smoot-Hawley Act. TTT proponents sometimes 
present this history as illustrating the turn from Nash-optimization to cooperation. See, e.g. Bagwell & Staiger, 
supra note 82, at 237-238. However, motives for large countries’ term-of-trade manipulations exist even for 
governments without protectionist preferences and even if they are not reactions to similar actions taken by other 
countries. Nash-optimal tariffs are thus found also in times of “peace.” See Christian Broda, Nuno Limão, & David 
E. Weinstein, Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence, 98:5 AM. ECON. REV. 2032 (2008). 
199 See, e.g. P.R. Krugman, What should trade negotiators negotiate about?, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 113 (1997). 
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other governments adopting similar policies, as they seem to do in trade agreements.200 On the other 
hand, if governments do not aim to maximize national income, because they have distributional reasons 
to engage in protectionism, then they should not want to enter into agreements liberalizing trade for 
these same reasons: such agreements may enhance trade but lead to loss of national welfare once the 
distributional concerns are considered.  
 
In other words, without identifying the terms-of-trade motive, countries can only be seen as 
either entering GATT/WTO unnecessarily or doing so against their own interest.201 This hardly presents a 
satisfactory understanding of “one of the most successful international institutions ever created.”202 But 
because of TTT, economists no longer need to take the existence of international trade agreements as 
un-rationalizable and  exogenously given; instead, institutions like the WTO come to be seen as serving 
economically sensible purposes. This is one of the reasons why the TTT has become economists’ 
“standard model” for trade agreements.203  
 
Another attractive feature of the TTT is the impressive empirical evidence that has been 
gathered to support its logic. A basic empirical issue concerns whether countries possess market power 
in world markets and whether they set tariffs on the basis of this power. The evidence is that most 
countries, even small economies, have significant ability to alter their terms of trade on many imported 
products through tariffs. Moreover, researchers have shown that prior to joining the WTO, countries set 
higher tariffs on imports for which they could exert large effects on world prices, as compared to tariffs 
on imports where they have less market power.204 In contrast, negotiated tariffs under the WTO appear 
unrelated to market power, suggesting that trade agreements do limit the exercise of market power.205 
Similarly, rigorous empirical analysis suggests that the magnitude of tariff cuts secured by negotiations 
through the WTO on particular products is a function of the market power that countries agreeing to the 
tariff cuts hold with respect to the products: the greater the market power, the deeper the tariff cut.206 
Combined with other studies,207 the relevance of terms-of-trade manipulations both for unilateral tariff- 
setting and tariff negotiations within the WTO now seems, empirically, quite plausible. 
 
B. Rationalizing trade agreements 
 
 Having identified the basic function that cooperation through trade agreements can serve, TTT 
scholars devote substantial attention to how historical and institutional features of the GATT/WTO 
regime facilitate(d) such cooperation.208 Three examples illustrate the thrust of this scholarship: the 
                                                          
200 Or, as Paul Krugman puts it: “Countries seem willing to do themselves good only if others promise to do the 
same.” Id. at 113.  
201 This, of course, is how economists have awkwardly interpreted major international tax practices, as discussed in 
Part III. 
202 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 224.  
203 Regan, supra note 197; see Bagwell, Bown & Staiger, supra note 191 for a review of main alternative theories of 
trade agreements.  
204 Broda et al., supra note 198 (finding that this terms-of-trade motive explains much of the cross-industry 
variation in tariffs).  
205 Id.  
206 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the 
World Trade Organization, 101:4 AM. ECON. REV. 1238 (2011). 
207 For a summary of such evidence, see Bagwell, Bown & Staiger supra note 191, at 1147-1152. 
208 They thus undertake the second step in the common social scientific approach to explaining cooperation—
explaining how parties organize to enter and maintain cooperative arrangements.  
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agreement to use tariff rather than non-tariff barriers to trade to pursue protectionist policies; the WTO 
norm of reciprocity; and the enforcement mechanism of disciplined retaliation.209  
 
A most salient aspect of the GAAT/WTO architecture is the agreement to use only tariffs to limit 
market access of foreign suppliers. Many protectionist measures can impose costs on foreign exporters, 
resulting in worsening terms of trade for foreign countries. However, insofar as the goal of terms-of-
trade manipulation is concerned, the best means for achieving this goal is tariffs. This is because in 
addition to altering the terms of trade, tariffs generate tax revenue for the country that imposes them: 
other means for manipulating the terms of trade do not bring this benefit.210 TTT thus assumes that the 
tariff is the only policy that is distorted when countries Nash-optimize: behind-the-border measures are 
set efficiently under unilateral choices.211 It follows from this assumption that countries should be quite 
willing, when entering into trade agreements, to commit to refraining from erecting other non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade. This is exactly what the GATT/WTO rules do, as evidenced by the general 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions, import licensing schemes, and similar measures (GATT Article XI) 
as well as other rules. That is, countries follow a process of “tariffication”—"the conversion of most 
protectionist measures into tariffs.”212  
 
Importantly, such collective strategy substantially facilitates the process of reaching and 
maintaining agreement. This is because focusing on bargaining about tariffs alone “lowers the 
transactions costs of reciprocal trade negotiations . . . by reducing the number of protectionist 
instruments that are part of the negotiation.”213 Moreover, tariff changes are transparent and easy to 
detect, making tariff commitments easier to enforce than other types of commitments. Overall, the 
dominant focus on tariff as opposed to other protectionist measures defines the “shallow integration” 
approach of GATT/WTO. In contrast, a “deep integration” approach to trade agreements would involve 
negotiating about and monitoring changes in domestic regulatory policies of participating countries, 
making international cooperation much costlier. Thus, while unilateral motives for terms-of-trade 
manipulation give rise to the need for cooperation, the fact that tariffs are unilaterally the best way to 
manipulate terms of trade also makes cooperation based on “shallow integration” feasible.   
 
 Another fundamental feature of the GAAT/WTO architecture is the principle of reciprocity. Tariff 
reductions under the GATT/WTO commonly occur through bilateral bargaining, with the bilaterally-
negotiated tariff cuts subsequently “multi-lateralized” to all participants through the most-favored-
nation (MFN) rule. Reciprocity is important both for the initial bilateral bargaining, and for subsequent 
adjustments and the determination of remedies for the breach of obligations. The principle connotes 
the idea of “mutual changes in trade policy that bring about changes in the volume of each country’s 
imports that are of equal value to changes in the volume of its exports . . . a rough equivalence between 
the market-access value of the tariff cuts offered by one government and the concessions won from its 
trading partner.”214 TTT gives a particular interpretation to this principle: when two countries bargaining 
                                                          
209 TTT scholars examine many more historical and doctrinal aspects of the GATT system from the “terms of trade” 
lens, such as the most-favored nations norm, the principal supplier rule, sequential partial tariff cuts, and particular 
bargaining protocols. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 238-41, 244-247; Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger & 
Ali Yurukoglu, Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records, 12:3 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED 
ECON. 72 (2020); and generally, Bagwell, Bown & Staiger, supra note 191.     
210 See Sykes, supra note 83, at 792. 
211 Bagwell, Bown & Staiger, supra note 191, at 1147.  
212 Sykes, supra note 83, at 791. 
213 Id.  
214 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 241.  
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with each other secure reciprocity in this sense, they ensure that their terms of trade remain fixed 
before and after the negotiated tariff cuts. This gives support to TTT’s central tenet that trade 
agreements neutralize the terms-of-trade effect of tariff increases.215 Moreover, when a member takes 
actions that “nullify or impair” another government’s expected benefits under the agreement, 
GATT/WTO rules permit the latter government “to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions and 
thereby to retaliate in a reciprocal manner.”216 This again ensures that as long as countries remain under 
the GATT/WTO, changes in tariff rates do not lead to terms-of-trade changes.217  
 
Perhaps even more important to the GATT/WTO architecture than its specific doctrines are the 
mechanisms of enforcing trade agreements. TTT envisions that countries will always face the temptation 
to unilaterally select high tariffs and shift costs, and that “this temptation does not go away simply 
because an agreement is signed.”218 There is no supra-national body that can sanction countries in 
breach. Therefore, the only thing that presses back against the temptation to breach is the threat of 
retaliatory responses. TTT thus sees the enforcement of WTO obligations as entirely a matter of the 
ability and willingness of participants to retaliate in repeated games.219 
 
 If retaliation does occur, it must then be the case that a breach was not deterred by the threat 
of retaliation. However, it does not follow that cooperation completely breaks down. This is because the 
WTO dispute resolution mechanism enables two types of responses to apparent breaches. First, an 
aggrieved party can file a complaint with the WTO, thereby publicizing the other party’s breach. This 
publicity potentially enables countries other than the complainant country to threaten retaliation 
against the country in breach.220 Second, the WTO requires countries to adopt commensurate measures 
in retaliation.221 This requirement ensures that even retaliation reflects the norms of cooperation—in 
particular, the norm of reciprocity and the goal of restoring the terms of trade. Indeed, in some cases, 
new tariffs that are in breach of original trade agreements and WTO-authorized countermeasures 
amount to renegotiations or adjustments of the trade agreement. Such adjustments may often be 
necessary from the perspective of TTT. Countries’ market powers vary over time; to ensure that the 
countries experiencing a significant increase in market power still derive benefit from a trade 
agreement, the terms of the agreement may need to be altered.    
 
 TTT of course does not rationalize every aspect of the GATT/WTO regime. Far from it: a 
significant number of the regime’s features present a poor fit for TTT. A prominent example is that many 
                                                          
215 Bagwell, Bown & Staiger, supra note 191, at 1155 discuss empirical evidence that countries in fact negotiate 
tariffs cuts on a reciprocal basis.  
216 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 241. 
217 TTT offers two additional conjectures regarding the principle of reciprocity. First, the principle, in conjunction 
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218 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 82, at 248. 
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countries hold significant market power over world markets for specific exported products. In such 
cases, by TTT’s logic, countries could significantly improve their terms of trade by imposing export tariffs 
on the products, the cost of which would be partially passed onto importing countries.222 However, even 
though import tariffs and export tariffs can all be used to manipulate the terms of trade, the latter seem 
much less common. 223 Although this means that no trade agreement is needed to internalize the 
externalities of export tariffs, it seems to point to an incompleteness of TTT as a theory of countries’ 
unilateral policy choices. A related problem is the WTO’s treatment of export subsidies. Export subsidies 
in many contexts have the same effect as lowering import tariffs—both improve foreign countries’  
terms of trade—but while the WTO aims to achieve tariff reduction, it prohibits export subsidies.224 This, 
from TTT’s perspective, is an unresolved mystery.225  
 
 However, where TTT cannot rationalize a policy adopted by actual trade agreements, it 
simultaneously and naturally leads to a normative critique of such agreements—for example, perhaps it 
is a bad idea for the WTO to prohibit export subsidies. The plausibility of such a critique in turn derives 
from the theory’s strength, which is a matter of how it well it identifies other aspects of trade 
agreements that actually enable international cooperation to enhance global welfare. In this sense, TTT 
illustrates a positive theory that is at the same time policy-relevant.226     
 
In fact, TTT’s influence as a theory relies not only on its ability to rationalize and critique existing 
trade agreements such as the GATT/WTO. Even more importantly, it serves as a frame of reference for 
further scholarship aimed at identifying additional externalities of countries’ unilateral trade policies and 
the opportunities and challenges for cooperation. This is illustrated by a recent theory about trade 
policy coordination in the era of global offshoring, developed by Pol Antràs and Robert Staiger.227 Antràs 
and Staiger start with the observation that the majority of the world’s merchandise trade is in 
intermediate inputs, and the share of differentiated products in such trade has been rising—a 
phenomenon commonly referred to as the “offshoring” of production.228 They suggest that cross-border 
contracts on the trade in differentiated inputs tend to be incomplete, and prices in such contracts 
between input suppliers and final good producers are often determined by bargaining after investment 
in input supply has been made, instead of through price clearing on anonymous markets.229 Such 
“bilateral monopolies” can create substantial inefficiency—in particular, an inefficiently low volume of 
input trade—when there is “free trade” (i.e. in the absence of government interventions). Appropriate 
trade policy interventions such as import and export subsidies can therefore improve global welfare.  
 
However, Antràs and Staiger go on to show that Nash-optimal policy countries choose tend also 
to be inefficient. This is because in the context of bilateral price determination, trade policies can also 
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shift costs onto foreign trade partners. For example, import tariffs can change the conditions of ex post 
bargaining between foreign suppliers and domestic producers, leading to the shift of surplus from the 
former to the latter. Driven by this motive, Nash-optimal trade policies will continue to depress the 
volume of input trade.230 In addition, the country importing inputs and exporting final goods may be 
motivated to intervene in the trade of the final good—making the domestic price of the final good 
inefficiently low—because this can also help shift surplus from foreign input suppliers to domestic 
producers. As a result, simply negotiating about market access and trade volumes—which is the WTO’s 
“shallow integration” approach—will no longer be sufficient to undo the harm of Nash-optimal policies.    
 
Overall, Antràs and Staiger argue that the distinctive features of offshoring introduce novel 
reasons for trade policy intervention, new externalities from Nash-optimal policies, and new challenges 
for policy cooperation relative to an economy with market price clearing (which TTT studies). Like TTT, 
Antràs and Staiger clearly identify why countries should cooperate in the face of offshoring. But unlike 
TTT, there is no ready answer to the question of how countries can cooperate to achieve mutual gain.  
One implication of their theory is that further trade policy coordination may have to pursue a “deep 
integration” approach, where countries commit to constraining their behind-border, hard-to-monitor 
policies that affect trade.231 This in turn implies that the GATT/WTO do not adequately advance the 
objective of policy coordination. At the same time, both theory and practical experience suggest that the 
“deep integration” approach to trade agreements is much less likely to be successful than the 
GATT/WTO.232 Antràs and Staiger’s story has come to be recognized as plausible not only for 
differentiated inputs, but also especially for the trade in services.233 And the very limited success of the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) offers a basic illustration of the difficulty of deep 
integration.  
 
C. Assessing “folk theories” of tax cooperation 
 
I explained in Part II how standard economic scholarship on international taxation, which views 
the CIT’s chief international effect to be on mobile capital, has been unable to make sense of core 
international income tax practices of the 20th century: it has convincingly identified neither countries’ 
Nash-optimal policy choices nor opportunities for cooperative gain. It is now useful to briefly consider, 
against the benchmark of TTT, how well the broader legal and policy discourse on international taxation 
has delineated the scope of actual or potential cooperation. There are two “folk theories” about the 
rationale for cooperation in such discourse, corresponding to two distinct policy goals: the prevention of 
“double taxation,” and tax competition.234 It is useful to consider how each addresses three issues that 
TTT shows to be important in any story about cooperation: (1) What is harmful about non-cooperative 
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conduct? (2) What mutual benefits may parties derive from cooperation? And (3) What enforces and 
sustains cooperation? 
 
In terms of the prevention of “double taxation,” tax scholars and practitioners voice the 
intuition that since both source and residence countries can tax the same income, non-coordination may 
lead to excessive taxation of such income—which reduces global welfare by reducing cross-border trade 
and investment. This intuition implies that no single government’s tax policy is necessarily harmful in 
itself. It is when governments do not coordinate in their policies that harms arise. And the solution to 
the problem of double taxation is commonly thought to be mutual agreements about the allocation of 
taxing rights, over different types of income, among governments—a solution implemented by bilateral 
tax treaties.235  
 
Yet it is easy to see how this “theory” carries little explanatory power. To begin, is double 
taxation harmful for cross-border trade and investment, or taxation itself? Any change in the 
cumulative, tax burden cross-border transactions may have an impact on cross-border flows. Therefore, 
any change in unilateral tax rate-setting may have an impact on such flows, given the tax rate set by the 
other country. Therefore, the narrative about double taxation casts all unilateral choices of tax rates as 
having a potential negative effect, which is implausible.236 Moreover, allocating taxing rights among 
nations is not like deciding which side of the road cars should drive on: countries should not be expected 
to be indifferent about who gets to tax what income. Countries would benefit from cooperation to 
prevent double taxation only if what they lose from foregoing taxing rights is compensated by the 
benefits they derive from increased cross-border trade and investment. Yet there is no general intuition 
about who benefits more from cross-border trade and investment to guide the allocation of taxing 
rights. Nor does the general approach of bilateral tax treaties evidence any coherent intuition. As 
discussed in Part II.C, residence countries offer unilateral relief from double taxation, suggesting that 
they are more willing to forego taxing rights to restore cross-border flows. Because of this unilateral 
stance, tax treaties provide little additional relief and therefore would have little effect on such flows. 
Yet tax treaties also reduce source country tax rates, suggesting that source countries tax too much in 
the absence of coordination. The intuition about double taxation therefore addresses neither issue (1) 
or issue (2) in the explanation of cooperation.237  
 
Postulating the limitation of tax competition as the goal of international tax is problematic for 
different reasons. In the typical conception of tax competition, the harm of non-cooperative conduct is 
clear: a country’s decision to lower its tax rates has a negative externality on others—capital flows away 
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from other countries to the rate-lowering country.238 This addresses issue (1) in the explanation of 
cooperation. Yet issue (2)—how countries can mutually gain from cooperation—would go unaddressed, 
unless countries are assumed to be symmetrical and constrained in using the tax instrument they 
compete upon.239 These assumptions are generally false in contexts where the problem of tax 
competition is said to arise.  
 
The point of this quick review is that “folk theories” of international tax cooperation are rather 
unhelpful, and taking international tax cooperation for granted on the basis of such theories is 
unjustified. This becomes even more obvious when we consider how purported tax cooperation is 
enforced—issue (3) above. For bilateral tax treaties, if one contracting state breaches a treaty (e.g. it 
deviates from its allocated taxing rights), the only remedy for the other contracting state is to 
renegotiate the treaty or terminate it. There is no counterpart to the measures of commensurate, 
authorized retaliation under the WTO, and there is no mechanism for collective approbation of a 
breach. The threat of termination has apparently also not deterred many treaty overrides. As for 
proposals for ending tax competition, envisioned enforcement tends to take two forms: “blacklisting” 
countries engaging in “harmful tax practices”—"naming and shaming” such countries—or exercising 
“peer pressure” on countries that already belong to some other, more extensive cooperative (usually 
collective governance) regime, such as the EU. That is, the countries exercising sanctions are clearly 
unwilling to “retaliate” by resuming tax competition themselves. This highlights the asymmetries that 
the basic argument for tax competition seeks to ignore: countries do not all want to raise their tax rates; 
it is some high-tax countries that want other low-tax countries to raise their taxes. 
 
IV. Two Obstacles to Conceptualizing International Tax Cooperation 
 
 TTT (along with theories building upon it, such as the theory of offshoring) is a specialized 
economic theory about the WTO and other trade agreements.240 Its strength lies not in how it resonates 
with “folk theories” of trade agreements,241 but in its rigorous logic, the empirical evidence in its 
support, and its clear (even if counter-intuitive for some) implications for policy. Its example suggests 
that to identify, explain, and criticize instances of international tax cooperation, one need not be bound 
by folk theories of cooperation. From this perspective, the problem with the economic models of 
international taxation discussed in Part II is not that they are obscure, but that the unresolved puzzles 
they generate lead to an intellectual stalemate in explaining countries’ non-cooperative and cooperative 
behavior.       
 
TTT actually possesses even more direct relevance to explaining unilateral policy choices in 
international taxation. The main Nash-optimal policy choice that TTT highlights is the imposition of 
import tariffs when the cost of such tariffs can be shifted onto foreigners. This form of “pecuniary 
externality” should be familiar to international tax scholars, since the idea that the economic incidence 
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of a tax might be borne by foreigners has always potentially justified source-based income taxation. 
However, as discussed in Part II.A, economists have treated this possibility as a secondary consideration 
because they assume the CIT’s main effect is on globally mobile and homogeneous capital. Given this 
assumption, the CIT imposed by a small open economy cannot be borne by foreign capital owners and 
can only fall on local immobile productive factors. The counterpart to this tax orthodoxy in trade would 
be an assumption that import tariffs are always borne by domestic consumers and input users and have 
no effect on world prices. Clearly, TTT and other trade theorists reject this latter assumption: both 
theory and empirical evidence demonstrate that tariffs imposed on specific lines of traded goods do 
affect their world prices.  
 
As also discussed in Part II.A, the thesis that the burden of a source-based CIT can fall on 
foreigners is associated, in the analysis of international taxation, with the notion of “location-specific 
rent” (LSR). Tax economists have tended to assume that LSR is important only in a few industries such as 
natural resource extraction. Trade economists would probably find this quite surprising. Consider 
intellectual property (IP) rights, the deployment of which is central to MNC activity. By their very 
definition, IP rights such as patents possess two properties: they embody unique inventions and 
therefore are inherently non-homogeneous, and the market price of a product embodying an IP is 
higher than its marginal cost of production. Moreover, most types of IP afford simultaneous, non-rival 
deployment in different countries.242 This implies that MNCs owning IP rights will practice geographic 
price discrimination, and that there will likely be no world price for products embodying IP. Imperfect 
markets, differentiated inputs, and bilateral monopolies thus pervade MNC activities. In such contexts, 
as Antras and Staiger have shown, potentials abound for unilateral fiscal instruments to shift costs onto 
foreigners and thereby generate pecuniary externalities. 
 
 If, however, LSR (or cost-shifting onto foreigners) is as pervasive as recent advances in trade 
economics suggest, then interpreting source country income taxation as a unilateral, Nash-optimal 
policy becomes as plausible as TTT’s basic premise that countries pursue “optimal tariffs.” In other 
words, explaining source-based taxation should not be so difficult after all. Such an approach would also 
directly rationalize numerous other tax policy choices. For example, the DST recently adopted by some 
countries—and which the OECD’s Pillar One proposal bans—can be analogized either to resource 
royalties243 or self-assessed tariffs on imported digital services.244 The ability of DST to shift costs onto 
foreign platform companies is well-supported by the zero marginal cost of many digital services, the 
presence of imperfect competition (through IP protection or network effect), and the non-rival nature of 
the technology involved.245 While the DST has widely been demonized as both unilateral and self-
defeating,246 from the perspective of economic theory it is easily explained as Nash-optimal policy—and, 
it must be recognized, international taxation would make more sense if we could rationalize the CIT in 
the same way.  
 
 Yet identifying unilateral optimal policies is only the first step to the analysis of international 
cooperation. As Part III emphasized, if some countries’ Nash-optimal policies exert pecuniary 
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externalities on other countries (and especially if the purpose of such policies is to profit from such 
externalities), their removal through cooperation would make sense only if countries can derive mutual 
gains.247 According to TTT, countries engaged in reciprocal reductions of import tariffs through the GATT 
can gain from the more efficient (i.e. increased) volume of resulting trade; the loss of tax revenue that 
would have been collected at the expense of foreigners is compensated by recouping the loss to one’s 
own exporters created by the other country’s optimal import tariffs. Along the same lines, one can 
imagine that reciprocal reductions of source country CITs may allow countries that are roughly 
symmetrical with each other to increase trade and investment flows among them, without either losing 
net tax revenue. This possibility may explain the early bilateral tax treaties between pairs of advanced 
countries. At the same time, it would support criticisms that many legal scholars have levied against the 
proliferation of bilateral tax treaties, based on the OECD model tax convention between pairs of 
developed and developing countries, since trade and investment flows between them tend to be far 
from symmetrical.248  
 
Nonetheless, there is a basic difficulty in transposing TTT directly into the analysis of 
international tax cooperation. A key assumption of TTT is that important tariffs are the “first-best” 
instruments for countries intent on pursuing terms-of-trade manipulations. It is because of this that 
countries can pursue cooperation through the GATT’s and WTO’s shallow integration approach (which in 
turn, according to TTT, explains the GATT’s and WTO’s successes.) By contrast, it is far from obvious—in 
fact it is quite unlikely—that the CIT is the first-best policy instrument for capturing LSR. This is first 
because the CIT applies across all corporations, as opposed to individual products and markets—LSR is 
much easier to isolate at these latter levels.249 For capturing LSR, in other words, the CIT is a very blunt 
instrument. Secondly, the CIT also serves as a purely domestic policy instrument—as a substitute for or 
complement to taxing shareholders that are resident individuals—and must therefore be coordinated 
with the personal income tax. Thus, even if the source-based CIT has optimal-tariff-like effects, its 
dissimilarities from tariffs in these two respects render it more like non-tariff methods for manipulating 
terms of trade—what trade specialists call non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade.  
 
Analyses from trade economics would thus predict that CIT—if it is used as a tariff-like 
instrument—is very difficult for countries to cooperate on. This is for at least two reasons. First, since 
the CIT serves both purely domestic policy purposes and as a way of extracting surplus from foreigners, 
it will be difficult to distinguish between a policy change that accomplishes legitimate domestic policy 
purposes and one that has a beggar-thy-neighbor intent. In this and other ways, the CIT is far less 
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transparent than tariffs, making monitoring compliance (with any agreement that constrains the CIT’s 
pecuniary externalities on foreigners) more difficult. Second, the CIT is not a stable policy instrument. 
Even for purely domestic policy purposes, and even if domestic political configurations do not change, 
there are plenty of substitutes for the CIT (such as shareholder-level taxation), as well as more and less 
efficient forms of the CIT (such as those that tax only corporate rent and those that tax the normal 
return to capital). And for the purpose of extracting rent from foreigners, there are eminently superior 
(e.g. more targeted) policy choices, such as sector-specific rent taxes and product-/service-specific 
excise taxes such as the DST. 
 
To summarize, one can point to two fundamental intellectual obstacles to understanding the 
scope of potential international cooperation that are unique to policy and scholarly discourses about the 
CIT. The first is an unwarranted assumption that the international economic impact of the CIT is 
primarily on mobile, homogeneous capital. The second is the assumption that the CIT’s importance as a 
tax instrument is immutable and must be taken as a given. The former assumption poses insuperable 
challenges in the characterization of Nash-optimal behavior. The latter assumption dramatically limits 
the type of international cooperation studied and that can be feasibly envisioned. There is no 
counterpart to either of these two peculiar assumptions in the theory of trade agreements.  
 
It is thus deeply ironic that the new international tax agreements promoted by the G7 and OECD 
in 2021, which purport to usher in the most important changes to international taxation in 100 years—
essentially the CIT’s entire history—are justified precisely on these two outdated assumptions. As 
discussed in Part I, the G7 and OECD falsely portray tax competition over globally mobile capital as a 
global first-order problem, one that all countries can gain from solving. At the same time, they promote 
the idea that countries are morally deficient if they adopt CIT rates that are too low. The United States, 
in particular, which came close to abolishing the CIT in 2017 when considering the adoption of the 
destination-based cash-flow tax,250 did a 180-degree turn and now calls for an international alliance to 
punish all countries that rely on the CIT less than it does.251 And while it is far from clear that world will 
succeed in propping up the CIT this way—Part I.C argued that the OECD’s Two Pillars do not even really 
try—the OECD agreement will ensure that countries surrender a unilaterally efficient tax instrument, 




 In proposing new international tax agreements in 2021, the governments of the G7 countries 
and the OECD have presented the rationales for international tax cooperation as self-evident. A broad 
population of journalists and non-specialist commentators also assume that the new agreements aim at 
ending tax competition and MNC tax avoidance, and strongly support these objectives. This Article has 
argued that, in fact, the rationales for international cooperation on the CIT are anything but self-evident. 
Not only has there been no single answer to the question, “Why should countries cooperate in 
international tax?”, there has also been not one persuasive answer. 
 
Ending most forms of MNC tax avoidance does not require global cooperation. Nor is requiring 
all countries to impose CITs with a minimum rate a worthy objective for the global community. 
Consistent with these assessments, the OECD’s Two Pillar proposal is designed neither to significantly 
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reduce tax avoidance (relative to what is unilaterally feasible) nor to limit tax competition. Instead, it 
aims to secure favorable outcomes for MNCs by limiting unilateral anti-avoidance rules and novel 
instruments for taxing MNCs. Both come especially at the expense of developing countries, but the 
MNC-favorable outcomes hardly command public support even in rich countries.   
 
 The spurious claims about why and how nations should cooperate in international taxation are 
widely circulated in recent policy discussions and have thrust international tax scholarship into a state of 
intellectual crisis. The Article argued that standard economic theory in international taxation has offered 
little useful guidance about how to conceive of international cooperation. One might say that as far as 
economists are concerned, whatever happens in international tax just happens. Consequently, the 
interpretation of 20th-century international tax practices is left to folk theories about preventing double 
taxation or tax competition. The ad hoc and self-contradictory theories espoused in 2021 threaten to 
become new occupants of this intellectual vacuum.  
 
 This Article contrasts this state of intellectual crisis with economic theories of trade agreements. 
The terms-of-trade theory has supplanted folk theories about the WTO, offers testable interpretations 
of trade agreements, and identifies both old defects in and new challenges for trade agreements. It does 
so by following a basic social scientific template for explaining cooperation—convincingly characterizing 
Nash-optimal behavior, identifying the inefficiencies of such behavior, and delineating the mechanisms 
of cooperation. The Article also highlights two basic unquestioned assumptions, generally made by 
international tax scholars, that may prevent the development of an analogue of TTT in international tax: 
the primary subject matter of international taxation is capital mobility, and the CIT is immutable. The 
new international tax agreements of 2021 seek to lock in these outdated assumptions. But we may only 
be able to understand and envision international tax cooperation by casting these assumptions aside.    
 
 
 
 
 
